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WITHOUT DOORS: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE
CONVENTION
Mary Sarah Bilder*
Wednesday last arrived in this city, from the Cherokee nation, Mr.
Alexander Droomgoole, with Sconetoyah, a War Captain, and son to one
of the principal Chiefs of that nation. They will leave this place in a few
days, for New-York, to represent to Congress some grievances, and to
demand an observance of the Treaty of Hopewell, on the Keowee, which
they say has been violated and infringed by the lawless and unruly whites
on the frontiers.
We are informed that a Choctaw King, and a Chickasaw Chief, are also
on their way to the New-York, to have a Talk with Congress, and to
brighten the chain of friendship.
—Pennsylvania Mercury, June 15, 17871

INTRODUCTION
The Constitution’s apparent textual near silence with respect to Native
Nations is misleading. As this Article reveals, four representatives of Native
Nations visited Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. Their visit ensured that
the Constitution secured the general government’s treaty authority with
Native Nations and decisively barred state claims of authority. But, the visits
also threatened to disrupt Congress’s passage of the Northwest Ordinance
and the vision of nationally sanctioned white settlement. In the process of
successfully preventing the representatives from reaching Congress,
Secretary at War Henry Knox developed the central tenets of what would
* Founders Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This Article was prepared for the
Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the Fordham Law Review on
October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. I am particularly grateful to Colin G.
Calloway, whom I met at Mount Vernon when I was curious about 1787 visits to Philadelphia.
Colin wrote, “A delegation of Choctaws led by a chief called Taboca visits Philadelphia and
NY in the summer of 1787. There may be more.” Email from Colin G. Calloway, Professor
of Hist. & Native Am. Stud., Dartmouth Coll., to author (Sept. 16, 2016) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). My thanks to Gregory Ablavsky, Colin G. Calloway, David Nichols,
Greg O’Brien, Charles Weeks, and the Symposium participants, and in particular, to Avi
Soifer for his careful reading and suggestions and to Vanessa Bernard and Timothy Conklin
for reading an early draft. For assistance with materials, I thank the William L. Clements
Library at the University of Michigan, the Oklahoma Historical Society, Archivo General de
Indias, the Mississippi Department of Archives & History, and Laurel Davis, Deena Frazier,
Helen Lacouture, and Caitlin Ross.

1. Philadelphia, June 15., PA. MERCURY & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, June 15, 1787.
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become the George Washington administration’s early Indian policy: an
acceptance of Native Nation sovereignty, disapproval of unauthorized white
encroachment, and an attempt to discourage Native Nations from sending
additional representatives. In addition to emphasizing the strong national
federal government role and Native Nation sovereignty, this history provides
evidence that the Framers’ generation without doors—outside the
Convention—critically affected the creation of the Constitution as an
instrument and a system of government.
Figure 1: Back of the State House2

I. A CONSTITUTION OF TREATIES
On June 18, 1787, four deputies of the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw
Nations were in Philadelphia. At the time, their presence was widely
reported. They met George Washington and other Philadelphia Convention
members, as well as congressional delegates and the secretary at war, Henry
Knox. Although their visits have received some discussion by historians,
accounts of the Convention entirely overlook their presence.3
2. William Russell Birch, Back of the State House, Philadelphia (illustration) (1800).
3. See, e.g., COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE INDIAN WORLD OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 306–07
(2018); STANLEY W. HOIG, THE CHEROKEES AND THEIR CHIEFS: IN THE WAKE OF EMPIRE 70–
71 (1998); GREG O’BRIEN, CHOCTAWS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE, 1750–1830 (2005); U.S.
NAT’L PARK SERV., SIGNERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 53 (Robert G. Ferris ed., 1976) (including
an illustration of a newspaper article); Greg O’Brien, The Conqueror Meets the Unconquered:
Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the Post-revolutionary Southern Frontier, 67 J.S. HIST.
39, 67 (2001); Daniel Flaherty, “People to Our Selves”: Chickasaw Diplomacy and Political
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The erasure of these deputies has resulted in what is taken to be the relative
silence of the Convention on the constitutional relationship with Native
Nations. The basic components of the Constitution’s drafting history have
been well documented.4 Historian Francis Paul Prucha, for example, wrote
that “very little attention was paid to the issue in the Constitutional
Convention, and there was no extensive statement about Indians in the
Constitution itself.”5 As legal scholar Gregory Ablavsky recently wrote,
“[h]istories of the Constitution, even very recent ones, assume this absence
reflects Indians’ irrelevance, and so almost entirely omit Natives.”6 The
major treatise about Native Nations covers the Convention in one paragraph.7
The absence of Indigenous people from the Convention’s history means that
even scholarship emphasizing the broader contextual history of Native
Nations is nevertheless relegated to a focus on white political figures.8
This Article shifts traditional analysis. First, I believe that in the summer
of 1787, the “Constitution” remained a concept referring to a system of
government. The instrument drafted that summer reconfigured the
constitution but the instrument was not yet the Constitution itself. The
Constitution as an instrument should therefore be interpreted within the
larger concept of the Constitution as a system of government. Second, with
respect to this Constitution as a system of government, the drafters were
hardly the only relevant actors. A larger framing generation drafted the
Constitution as a system of government.9 To refer to this context, the
delegates used the phrase “without doors”10 and I employ that phrase here.

Development in the Nineteenth Century 75–87 (2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Oklahoma) (ProQuest).
4. See, e.g., FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 68–70 (1994); Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause,
124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1021 (2015) [hereinafter Ablavsky, The Indian Commerce Clause];
Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1147–58
(1995); Timothy J. Preso, A Return to Uncertainty in Indian Affairs: The Framers, the
Supreme Court, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 443, 452–54 (1994).
See generally Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014)
[hereinafter Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution].
5. PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 68.
6. Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, supra note 4, at 1002.
7. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[3], at 22–23 (Nell Jessup
Newton ed., 2012).
8. See generally Robert J. Miller, American Indian Constitutions and Their Influence on
the United States Constitution, 159 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 32 (2015).
9. See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Emerging Genre of The Constitution: Kent Newmyer and
the Heroic Age, 52 CONN. L. REV. 1263, 1265–69 (2021).
10. For usage of the phrase, see, for example, Letter from James Madison to William Short
(June 6, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 31, 31 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1977) (“But the labor is great indeed; whether we consider the real or imaginary difficulties
within doors or without doors.”); 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1787–1870, at 330 (1900) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE CONSTITUTION] (“Butler. The security the South[ern] States want is that their negroes
may not be taken from [them] which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very
good mind to do.” (second alteration in original)).
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The framing generation without doors was as responsible for the creation of
the Constitution as the white men inside the Convention hall.11
Analyzing the framing generation of the Constitution is a particularly
useful approach in relationship to people whose paths became inextricably
entwined with the development of the United States as a political and
territorial state but who were not formally represented by the white deputies
in the room. Robert Clinton points out that “for Indian Nations, forging a
treaty initially did not constitute, as in Europe, a process of forming a
temporary alliance memorialized in a written document; it involved instead
the formation of metaphoric, organic kinship ties.”12 Treaty making did not
create a “static document” but “an organic and dynamic kinship between the
treaty partners.”13 For Native Nations, the 1787 instrument did not abolish
prior relationships with Congress and these relationships continued, albeit
significantly reformulated. Likewise, the new instrument did not repudiate
but in fact reconfirmed prior treaty relationships. A focus on the framing
generation incorporates the influence of Native Nations on the Constitution
without denying their sovereignty.14 Attention to the 1787 visits is a
corrective measure to the classic use of the text of the 1787 Constitution as a
starting point for constitutional analysis of federal Indian law.15
11. See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, FEMALE GENIUS: THE LADY, GEORGE
WASHINGTON, AND THE AGE OF THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2022) (recounting the
influence of Eliza Harriot Barons O’Connor, a female lecturer, on the Convention).
12. Robert Clinton, Treaties with Native Nations: Iconic Historical Relics or Modern
Necessity?, in NATION TO NATION: TREATIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICAN
INDIAN NATIONS 15, 17 (Suzan Shown Harjo ed., 2014).
13. Id.
14. For a similar approach with respect to the influence on the revolutionary period, see
generally KATHLEEN DUVAL, INDEPENDENCE LOST: LIVES ON THE EDGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (2015); WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA (1999); ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 1750–1804 (2016); RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE
GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–1815 (20th
anniversary ed. 2011).
15. Several word choices are of particular importance. In contrast with many scholars, I
use the terms “general government” and “Congress” (without “Continental” or
“Confederation”) to refer to the political institutions of the United States. Whether the
reconstituted government was to be national or federal was a key debate and the meaning of
those terms was shifting. “General government” simply describes a government broader than
that of the states. “Congress” underscores the institution’s continuity throughout this period,
particularly as far as Native Nations were concerned. I refer to the Native Nations
representatives as “deputies.” I like this word because most of the delegates sent to
Philadelphia from the states were described as deputies. 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 96, 199, 200, 203–04, 213, 222–23 (Merrill Jensen
ed., 1976) [hereinafter DHRC] (describing the appointment of deputies in Virginia,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, Maryland, and New
Hampshire). And, I am aware of the ironic fact that decades later, Justice William Johnson
insisted that the Hopewell Treaties’ authorization of a deputy did not mean that such a person
“was to be recognized as a minister, or to sit in the congress as a delegate.” Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 25 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring). Because contemporary
correspondence repeatedly referred to “Nations,” I have followed that practice. See DOROTHY
V. JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE: COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY AMERICA 20 (1982)
(applying Emer de Vattel’s definition); Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Treaties as Recognition of a
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An explanation of the prior constitutional relationship between the Native
Nations and the United States will help situate readers.16 During the decade
between Congress’s Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the calling of
the Convention in 1786, treaties formed the foundation of the constitutional
relationships between the many Native Nations and Congress, as well as their
relationships with the former colonies.17 Treaties underpinned the British
government’s prior constitutional relationship to Native Nations.18 Of
particular importance, the Proclamation of 1763 established the principle that
Indian lands could only come into white possession through purchase or legal
cession.19 When twenty-four Native Nations gathered with copies of the
Proclamation to exchange gifts and the two-row wampum belt with the
British, this treaty agreement, based on “peace, friendship, and respect,”
reaffirmed “their preexisting rights to self-government.”20
Before declaring independence a little over a decade later, Congress took
the first steps to construct a similar constitution based on treaties with Native
Nations. In July 1775, the self-described “general congress at Philadelphia”
reached out to the Six Nations, “our brothers,” and stated, “we wish you
Indians may continue in peace with one another, and with us the white
people.”21 The 1778 Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation guaranteed
Nation-to-Nation Relationship, in NATION TO NATION, supra note 12, at 34, 34–35; O’Brien,
supra note 3, at 42–43 (discussing the complexity of “nation” or “confederacy” with respect
to the Choctaw Nation); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1069, 1082–86 (2004). The claim that “Nation” in this context was not meant to assert
sovereignty does not appear to me to align with contemporary evidence. See Robert G.
Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV.
201, 259 (2007) (citing both Latin and English dictionary definitions). Similarly,
correspondence from Native Nations uses the terms “American” or “white” in contrast with
“Indians,” in reference to control of territory and encroachment. See CALLOWAY, supra note
3, at xv; see also LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 6–7 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the consequences of terms). I have
followed suit.
16. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, § 1.02[1]–[3], at 16–
23 (summarizing this history); see also PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 23–66.
17. See DAVID J. CARLSON, SOVEREIGN SELVES: AMERICAN INDIAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND
THE LAW 35–37 (2006) (noting that “Indian treaties construct (and, over time, reproduce) the
parties and sovereign communities that they bind together”); JONES, supra note 15, at 148;
Richard W. Hill, Linking Arms and Brightening the Chain: Building Relations Through
Treaties, in NATION TO NATION, supra note 12, at 37–42; Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power
over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 200–01 (1984)
(describing the treaty era). See generally Reginald Horsman, The Indian Policy of an ‘Empire
for Liberty,’ in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 37 (Frederick E. Hoxie et al.
eds., 1999).
18. See JONES, supra note 15, at 93–119; DANIEL K. RICHTER, FACING EAST FROM INDIAN
COUNTRY: A NATIVE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICA 134–50 (2001).
19. See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN: 1763 AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF NORTH AMERICA 92–100 (2007).
20. Id. at 96–97; see John Borrows, Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation,
Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN
CANADA: ESSAYS ON LAW, EQUALITY, AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE 155 (Michael Asch ed.,
1997).
21. “Speech” to the Six Nations (July 13, 1775), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775–1979, at 25, 26, 28
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“aforesaid nation of Delawares, and their heirs, all their territorial rights in
the fullest and most ample manner.”22 They could “form a state whereof the
Delaware nation shall be the head, and have a representation in Congress.”23
But the official end of the war with the British in 1783 redrew the map. As
Colin Calloway notes, “There were no Indians at the Peace of Paris in 1783
when Britain handed over their lands to the United States and the new
republic acquired an empire.”24 Despite the general impotence of Congress,
agreements with Native Nations were prioritized.25 Between 1783 and 1786,
Native Nations participated in twenty-one treaties; slightly more than half
were with Americans—six with Congress and seven with the states.26 The
initial treaties established by Congress after 1783 involved the territory north
of the Ohio River and have been characterized by historians as involving
arrogance and demands by congressional representatives with “partial at
best” Native Nation representation.27

(Vine Deloria Jr. & Raymond J. DeMallie eds., 1999). See generally James H. Merrell,
Declarations of Independence: Indian-White Relations in the New Nation, in THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 197 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1987).
22. Treaty with the Delawares, Del. Nation-U.S., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13; COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, § 1.02[2], at 18.
23. Treaty with the Delawares, supra note 22.
24. CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 283. For more discussion on the absence of deputies at
the Treaty of Peace, see COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN INDIAN
COUNTRY: CRISIS AND DIVERSITY IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 273 (1995).
25. See WALTER MOHR, FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS, 1774–1788, at 93–172 (1933)
(discussing federal policy in the 1780s). See generally REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, 1783–1812 (1967) (discussing federal policy); Reginald Horsman,
American Indian Policy in the Old Northwest, 1783–1812, 18 WM. & MARY Q. 35 (1961).
26. CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 284–85; see JONES, supra note 15, at 188–95.
27. CALLOWAY, supra note 24, at 283; 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS 278–81
(Alden T. Vaughan & Colin G. Calloway eds., 1994); DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED
GENTLEMEN & WHITE SAVAGES: INDIANS, FEDERALISTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER ON THE
AMERICAN FRONTIER 24–36 (2008).

2021]

NATIVE NATIONS AND THE CONVENTION

1713

Figure 2: A New Map of North America, with the West India Islands28

But 1785–1786 seemed to signal a different approach, at least with respect
to the significant Native Nations in the south. Congress sought to neutralize
Spanish influence with the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek
Nations. Between late 1786 and early 1787, treaty commissioners, Benjamin
Hawkins, Joseph Martin, and Andrew Pickens formed almost identical
treaties with the Cherokee Nation, the Choctaw Nation, and the Chickasaw
Nation. These treaties became known as the “Hopewell Treaties” because
they were negotiated at Pickens’s home, Hopewell, on the Keowee River.29
Boundaries were at the center. In November 1785, Old Tassel (who was
the First Beloved Man), thirty-six chiefs, and almost a thousand Cherokee
citizens attended the treaty meeting at which Old Tassel drew the Cherokee
boundaries on a map for the commissioners.30 The Treaty described the
boundary “between the said Indians and the citizens of the United States”
and exiled from United States protection any citizen or “person not being an
Indian” who remained within the boundaries after six months.31 Congress
was to possess the “sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the
Indians, and managing all their affairs.”32 The Treaty also provided a formal

28. Thomas Pownall, A New Map of North America, with the West India Islands
(illustration) (1786), in THOMAS KITCHIN, A GENERAL ATLAS DESCRIBING THE WHOLE
UNIVERSE 30–31 (London, Robert Sayer 1790) (portraying a continent dominated by Native
Nations).
29. See CALLOWAY, supra note 24, at 209, 235, 284; NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 44–54.
30. See CALLOWAY, supra note 24, at 209; CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 304.
31. Treaty with the Cherokee, Cherokee Nation-U.S., Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18.
32. Id.
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mechanism to ensure the “justice of the United States.”33 A provision
authorized a deputy to be sent to Congress stating “[t]hat the Indians may
have full confidence in the justice of the United States, respecting their
interests, they shall have the right to send a deputy of their choice, whenever
they think fit, to Congress.”34
Immediately following this provision was the Treaty’s language stating
that the peace and “friendship re-established” was to be maintained through
the “utmost endeavors” of both sides.35 Sending a deputy to Congress was
to promote furtherance of the treaty relationship. The explicit provision
relating to a deputy did not appear in the January 1786 Treaties with the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, but these treaties were otherwise
prominently similar.36 The three Hopewell Treaties were published together
in newspapers as if they represented one larger constitutional treaty
establishing an understanding with all three nations.37
In the wake of the Treaties, Congress began to take steps to consolidate its
authority with respect to the states. Under the Articles of Confederation,
Congress had the “sole and exclusive right and power” of “entering into
treaties and alliances.”38 The Articles explicitly barred the states, without
consent of Congress, from entering into “any conference, agreement,
alliance, or treaty, with any King, prince or state.”39 In addition, Congress’s
powers included that of “regulating the trade and managing all affairs with
the Indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative
right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated.”40 The
drafting history of this provision was complicated; particularly contested was
the carveout: “not members of any of the states.”41 Subsequently, in August
1786, Congress divided the United States into two geographic departments
with respect to Indian affairs and created a superintendent position for the

33. Id.
34. Id.; see ANNIE H. ABEL, PROPOSALS FOR AN INDIAN STATE, 1778–1878, at 89 (1970)
(discussing this provision and concluding that “we are obliged to infer that no great departure
from existing practices was in contemplation”); see also Ezra Rosser, The Nature of
Representation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional Delegate, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91,
120–29 (2005) (discussing the right to a deputy under the 1835 Treaty of New Echota); Ezra
Rosser, Promises of Nonstate Representatives, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 118, 119 (2007).
35. Treaty with the Cherokee, supra note 31, at 10.
36. See Treaty with the Chickasaw, Chickasaw Nation-U.S., Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24;
Treaty with the Choctaw, Choctaw-U.S Nation, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21.
37. See, e.g., Articles of a Treaty Concluded at Hopewell, FED. GAZETTE & PHILA. DAILY
ADVERTISER, Sept. 15, 1790.
38. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX; 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 86, 89–90;
see COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, § 1.02[2], at 18–19;
Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, supra note 4, at 1012–13; Clinton, supra note 4, at 1098–
106.
39. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI; see also 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 88.
40. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX; see also 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 91.
41. See William David Cummings, “The Indians May Be Led, but Will Not Be Drove”:
The Creek Indians Struggle for Control of Its Own Destiny, 1783–1794, at 137–38 (Mar.
2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, North Dakota State University) (ProQuest) (discussing Georgia’s
alleged interpretation of the Creek as “members” under earlier treaties).

2021]

NATIVE NATIONS AND THE CONVENTION

1715

southern section below the Ohio River.42 In October, James White was
Virginia governor Edmund Randolph interpreted the
appointed.43
appointment as an exercise of congressional authority bringing to an end the
authority of Virginia’s own agent, Joseph Martin.44 For the three Native
Nations, Congress, and Virginia, the Hopewell Treaties confirmed
Congress’s dominance over the states.
But, for North Carolina and Georgia—states that had not yet ceded their
claimed western boundaries—the Treaties raised the possibility that the
general government would stop unauthorized white encroachment.45 A
patchwork of cessions, many contested and based on various purchases and
state treaties, created theoretical areas open to white settlement. Areas ceded
by one group remained disputed by another.46 At Hopewell, North
Carolina’s agent, William Blount, protested the Treaty and stated that it
infringed on the state’s “legislative rights.”47 The North Carolina governor
and the legislature passed a law declaring that anything done by the treaty
commissioners was “null and void.”48 Along with Georgia, North Carolina
developed semantic interpretations of the Articles under which the two states
refuted congressional authority. Treaty commissioner Benjamin Hawkins—
himself a North Carolina congressional delegate—explained the arguments
in a letter to Thomas Jefferson about the fate of the “aborigines.”49 Although
the Treaties had been attentive to “the rights of these people,” the two states
launched protests.50 Georgia “will not allow that the Indians can be viewed
in any other light than as members thereof” of the state, thereby claiming
authority under the carveout within the Articles.51 North Carolina “allows a
right of regulating Trade only without the fixing any boundary between the
Indians and citizens, as they claim all the Land westward according to their
bill of rights and that the Indians are only tenants at will.”52 In addition, the
self-proclaimed State of Franklin under Governor John Sevier occupied
42. Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs, in 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, at 490, 491 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912).
43. 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 747 (Oct. 6, 1786).
44. See Stephen B. Weeks, General Joseph Martin and the War of the Revolution in the
West, in AM. HIST. ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE YEAR 1893, at 401, 459 (1894).
45. See generally Kathleen DuVal, Independence for Whom?: Expansion and Conflict in
the South and Southwest, in THE WORLD OF THE REVOLUTIONARY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: LAND,
LABOR, AND THE CONFLICT FOR A CONTINENT 97 (Andrew Shankman ed., 2014).
46. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC
22–23 (1986) (discussing the Chickamauga Cherokee).
47. Letter from William Blount to Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin &
Lachlan McIntosh (Nov. 28, 1785) (available at the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript
Library, University of Georgia); see Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, supra note 4, at 1029.
48. Extract from the Minutes of the Georgia General Assembly (Feb. 11, 1786), in 18
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 27, at 427–28; see also CALLOWAY, supra
note 3, at 304–05.
49. Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1786), in 9 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 640, 641(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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western territory that the Articles presumed would be ceded to the United
States but over which North Carolina had rescinded any cession.53 The
Franklinites used an “unscrupulous 1785 Treaty of Dumplin Creek” to claim
land reserved to the Cherokee Nation at Hopewell.54 Georgia maintained its
claims—referred to as Yazoo lands—until 1802.55 Indeed, in early August
1787, Georgia acquired a small strip of western land ceded from South
Carolina.56
From the perspective of the southern Native Nations, these disputed
western claims lay within their boundaries and the continued white
encroachment raised questions about the reliability of the United States.57
Indian communities disagreed over whether the United States or the Spanish
was more dependable. The Hopewell Treaty with the Chickasaw Nation did
not have the support of the pro-Spanish contingent.58 The Creek Nation
found itself divided. Alexander McGillivray led the largest contingent to
sign the Treaty of Pensacola with the Spanish in 1784, and the U.S.
commissioners were unsuccessful in achieving a treaty.59 The Spanish
remained committed to control of the Mississippi River—and the instability
of the United States worked to the advantage of the Spanish governor-general
in New Orleans. Throughout this period, the southern Native Nations
entertained repeated invitations and overtures from Spanish diplomatic
officials.60 Further complicating matters, various political leaders associated
with the white western settlements began to consider aligning themselves
with Spain—referred to by nineteenth-century historians as the “Spanish
Conspiracy.”61 In 1786, James White—the soon appointed superintendent
of Indian affairs for the southern district—began inquiries with the Spanish
minister Don Diego de Gardoqui, suggesting that the southern states might
leave the United States if the Mississippi were transferred to Spain.62
Thus 1786 marked a particularly fraught moment in the balance of power
and territory. As historian Colin Calloway has emphasized, “there was a time
when the outcome of the struggle seemed in doubt” and “Indian power . . .
53. Id.
54. Kevin T. Barksdale, The Spanish Conspiracy on the Trans-Appalachian Borderlands,
1786–1789, 13 J. APPALACHIAN STUD. 96, 103 (2007).
55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives (Apr. 26, 1802), in 37 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 49, at
343.
56. R. S. Cotterill, The South Carolina Land Cession, 12 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 376,
376–84 (1925).
57. See generally CHARLES A. WEEKS, PATHS TO A MIDDLE GROUND: THE DIPLOMACY OF
NATCHEZ, BOUKFOUKA, NOGALES, AND SAN FERNANDO DE LAS BARRANCAS, 1791–1795
(2005).
58. CALLOWAY, supra note 24, at 233–37.
59. Id. at 283–84; see also Randolph C. Downes, Creek-American Relations, 1782–1790,
21 GA. HIST. Q. 142, 159–61 (1937).
60. See generally Barksdale, supra note 54.
61. Id. at 97–119.
62. Resolution of Oct. 6, 1786, reprinted in 18 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA
756 (Walter Clark ed., 1900). See generally Anita S. Goodstein, Leadership on the Nashville
Frontier, 1780–1800, 35 TENN. HIST. Q. 175 (1976).

2021]

NATIVE NATIONS AND THE CONVENTION

1717

remained strong, despite the inroads of disease, dispossession, and escalating
warfare.”63 Indeed, 1786 brought increased opposition by Native Nations.
In January, a treaty at Fort Finney with the Shawnee Nation was
“disavowed.”64 In the northwest, Joseph Brant began to gather an Indian
confederacy.65 A northern confederacy threatened congressional and land
company plans for the area north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi.
Since 1784, congressional declarations and plans had imagined conversion
of northwestern territory into white-occupied and survey-defined new
states.66 But even after northern states ceded their paper colonial claims to
the general government in 1784 and 1786, the requisite purchases “of the
Indian inhabitants” remained largely in the future.67 In late 1786, the
northwest United Indian Nations declared that any “cession of our lands
should be made” only “by the united voice of the confederacy” and they
declared all “partial treaties” void.68 The United Indian Nations suggested
meeting in the spring of 1787 to pursue a general treaty.69 Requiring
Congress to deal with a united group of Native Nations and to pursue land
cessions only through such a group would have radically rebalanced the
power dynamic. With a barren treasury and a largely nonexistent military
force—and with Spain and Great Britain controlling surrounding
territories—the general U.S. government plausibly faced defeat in any war
with Native Nations.70
In this moment, four representatives of Native Nations set forth for
Congress. This Article recovers the story of their visits, including George
Washington’s public handshake with Sconetoyah, the Cherokee chief. It then
examines the consequences of the visits, focusing on Congress’s passage of
the Northwest Ordinance, Secretary at War Henry Knox’s report on Indian
Affairs, and the Convention’s drafting of clauses relating to Native Nations.
The conclusion traces the aftermath of the visits for the major actors. This
analysis largely supports Robert Clinton’s 1995 interpretation that the
Convention presumed the general government’s authority in dealing with
63. COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE VICTORY WITH NO NAME: THE NATIVE AMERICAN DEFEAT
OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 10 (2015) (describing the early 1790s).

64. Horsman, supra note 25, at 40.
65. WHITE, supra note 14, at 433.
66. Richard P. McCormick, The “Ordinance” of 1784?, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 112, 112–
13 (1993). See generally PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 3–58 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 2019) (1987); THE NORTHWEST
ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS, AND LEGACY (Frederick D. Williams
ed., 1989) (collecting essays on the ambiguous implications of the ordinance); Robert F.
Berkhofer Jr., Americans Versus Indians: The Northwest Ordinance, Territory Making, and
Native Americans, 84 IND. MAG. HIST. 90 (1988).
67. The Ordinance of 1784, reprinted in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
49, at 613; see also Reginald Horsman, The Northwest Ordinance and the Shaping of an
Expanding Republic, 73 WIS. MAG. HIST. 21, 25–32 (1989).
68. Speech of the United Indian Nations to Congress (Dec. 18, 1786), in 18 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 27, at 347, 356; see Jeffrey Ostler, ‘Just and
Lawful War’ as Genocidal War in the (United States) Northwest Ordinance and Northwest
Territory, 1787–1832, 18 J. GENOCIDE RSCH. 1, 5–6 (2016).
69. Speech of the United Indian Nations to Congress, supra note 68, at 357.
70. Horsman, supra note 25, at 40.

1718

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

Native Nations, accepted the autonomous legal status of the tribes, and
incorporated its broad “Commerce . . . . with the Indian Tribes”—including
affairs and trade—as a fail-safe to end illegitimate and dangerous claims of
state authority at long last.71
I believe that continually unfolding history is relevant to modern
constitutionalism and therefore am not an originalist. Indeed, significant
structural transformations in the relationship of Native Nations and the
United States since 1787 make selective use of this history particularly
tenuous as the sole basis for contemporary constitutional interpretation.72
Over more than two centuries, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence channeled
and legitimized the dispossession of Native Nations’ land, sovereignty, and
identities through a series of doctrines that shifted repeatedly.73 The most
important aspect of the history recounted in this Article is drawn from a
moment when Native Nations constituted a significant threat and controlled
most of the territory now considered part of the United States. The system
of government framed in the Constitution presumed the sovereignty of
Native Nations. Deputies to Congress reflected one aspect of this
recognition. Eventually, however, the provisions for a deputy to Congress in
the Fort Pitt and Hopewell Treaties were forsaken. It would be fitting and
just if the United States would now ensure representation of Native Nations
in Congress.74
II. A DEPUTATION TO CONGRESS
At the end of May 1787, newspapers began to report the progress of three
chiefs of Native Nations as they traveled to Congress; they were members of
the Cherokee Nation, the Choctaw Nation, and the Chickasaw Nation.75
Several months earlier, Governor Randolph of Virginia had learned of a
“deputation” to Congress from Native Nations.76 Newspaper reports of the
visits by the deputies circulated throughout the summer, intermingled with
reports on the Creek Nation, the murder of Cherokee hunters by Kentuckians,
71. Clinton, supra note 4, at 1147, 1156–57 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3); see
also Ablavsky, The Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 4, at 1022.
72. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No
Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 160 (2002). See generally
N. BRUCE DUTHU, SHADOW NATIONS: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL
PLURALISM (2013); KOUSLAA T. KESSLER-MATA, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE TROUBLE WITH
SOVEREIGNTY: STRUCTURING SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH FEDERALISM (2017); Matthew
L. M. Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution, 61 U. MIA. L. REV.
53 (2006); Frank Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows: The Missing Narrative in Indian
Law, 80 N.D. L. REV. 743 (2004).
73. See WILLIAM C. CANBY JR., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 15–37, 81–149 (7th
ed. 2020) (providing an overview).
74. See generally SMITH, supra note 15 (discussing obligations of research); SHAWN
WILSON, RESEARCH IS CEREMONY: INDIGENOUS RESEARCH METHODS (2008).
75. See, e.g., Frederick-Town, May 30. Extract of a Letter from Winchester, May 26,
1787, MD. CHRON. OR UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, May 30, 1787.
76. Letter from Arthur Campbell to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 9, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF
VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS 254 (William P. Palmer ed., Richmond,
W. M. Ellis Jones 1884) [hereinafter CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS].
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rising tensions over Franklin’s land office, and alleged Spanish intervention
in the west. Secretary at War Henry Knox left New York for Philadelphia in
June to meet specifically with the deputies. Outside of the Convention,
George Washington also met them, as did the governors of Virginia, North
Carolina, and Pennsylvania. Although Congress reconvened in early July to
adopt the Northwest Ordinance, the deputies would not appear, having been
persuaded to return home. But their visit had repercussions that changed the
Constitution and relationship of the United States to Native Nations.
A. The Choctaw Nation
Within months of the Hopewell Treaties, the Choctaw Nation decided to
hold the United States to the treaty commitments. The southwestern Native
Nations faced an increasingly volatile situation. Matters between Georgia
and the Creek Nation, led by Alexander McGillivray, reached a point of
collision. By 1786, “Creek Country [was] torn but also on the verge of allout war.”77 The Spanish supported McGillivray as part of their strategy to
ensure control of the Mississippi. The Oconee War broke out by November,
with the Spanish providing ammunition to Creek raiding parties.78 The other
Native Nations found themselves under pressure to choose a side. Indian
agent William Davenport wrote to Georgia’s governor that the Choctaw
Nation was being courted by the Spanish.79 The Spanish governor of
Louisiana and West Florida, Esteban Miró, sought the allegiance of
Franchimastabé, the head of the Choctaw Nation.80
At the end of November 1786, therefore, Franchimastabé sought
reassurance as to the friendship of the United States.81 In a talk for Congress,
he questioned whether the United States was disposed to preserve treaties,
focusing in particular on boundaries.82 In addition, the economic
impoverishment of the United States raised concerns about whether the
general government could carry through on promised trade.83 Congress
needed to demonstrate its enforcement of treaties made with Native Nations.
Underlying the talk was the implication that the Choctaw Nation could turn
to Spain if the United States failed to honor its treaties. Indeed, four months

77. KEVIN KOKOMOOR, OF ONE MIND AND OF ONE GOVERNMENT:
THE CREEK NATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 102 (2018).

THE RISE AND FALL OF

78. Id. at 83, 104–14; Cummings, supra note 41, at 102–25.
79. Letter from William Davenport to the Governor of Georgia (Nov. 1, 1786) (available
at the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia).
80. See WEEKS, supra note 57, at 155–59; James L. Hill, Muskogee Internationalism in
an Age of Revolution, 1763–1818, at 91–92 (May 2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, College of
William and Mary) (ProQuest).
81. Letter from Henry Knox to Frenchemastubié (June 27, 1787) (available at the William
L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) (responding to Franchimastabé’s
talk; the talk has not been located); see O’Brien, supra note 3, at 68.
82. See Letter from Henry Knox to Frenchemastubié, supra note 81.
83. See id.
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later, in March 1787, after hearing nothing from Congress, Taski Etoka (the
Chickasaw “king”) and Franchimastabée sent a talk to Miró.84
In focusing on Congress and the Treaty, the Choctaw Nation explicitly
rejected state authority and that of Georgia in particular. In the fall of 1786,
Georgia sent an agent, John Woods, to the Choctaw Nation with instructions
that ran counter to the Articles and the Treaties. The appointment of Woods
from Georgia was recent.85 Previously, he had traveled with Choctaw
delegations: in 1784, to Savannah, Georgia,86 and in January 1786 as an
escort and witness at the Hopewell Treaties.87 In March 1786, shortly after
the treaty meeting, the Georgia legislature gave Woods instructions asserting
the state’s sovereignty over the Choctaw Nation.88 In an effort to claim
authority under the Articles’ carveout, Georgia asserted control over the
Choctaw Nation as members of the state. Wood’s instructions declared:
“You are to consider the different Nations, Tribes or Towns of Indians within
the Jurisdiction aforesaid as Members of this State.”89 Georgia’s legal stance
put the state in direct conflict with Congress.
Not surprisingly, the Choctaw Nation rejected Georgia’s claim. As Woods
explained to the Georgia governor, the Choctaw Nation did not consider
Woods “Vested, with proper Authority, to transact the business of their
Nation, by virtue of [a] Commission, from the State of Georgia.”90 The
Hopewell Treaty represented a decision to treat with the “Continental
Commissioners.”91 The Choctaw Nation was “determined, to hold fast the
Treaty” and “they Would pay No regard to Any Authority, which did not
Originate, And derive, from Congress.”92 The Hopewell Treaty represented
the reciprocal commitment of the Choctaw Nation and Congress.93 Indeed,
Woods’s letter subtly emphasized the Choctaw Nation’s territorial
sovereignty: he had returned “into their land” and met at the “seat of
government” with “the King, and Great leading Chief, of that Nation.”94
Moreover, in referring to the “treaty . . . at Seneca”—the river, rather than
84. See Hill, supra note 80, at 91–92 (discussing a March 19, 1787, letter from the
Chickasaw king and Franchimastabé to Miró); Charles A. Weeks, Franchimastabé, MISS.
ENCYC. (Apr. 14, 2018), http://mississippiencyclopedia.org/entries/franchimastabe
[https://perma.cc/9H7G-E7MN].
85. See Brenden Edward Kennedy, The Yazoo Land Sales: Slavery, Speculation, and
Capitalism in the Early American Republic 46 (2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Florida) (ProQuest); Frances Bailey Kolb, Contesting Borderlands: Policy and Practice in
Spanish Louisiana, 1765–1803, at 270 (Aug. 2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University)
(ProQuest).
86. See Letter from John Habersham to Georgia Governor (June 19, 1784) (available at
the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia).
87. See O’Brien, supra note 3, at 61, 67.
88. See Letter from Georgia Governor & Council to John Woods (Mar. 1, 1786) (available
at the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia).
89. Id.
90. Letter from John Woods to Edward Telfair (Jan. 14, 1787) (available at the Hargrett
Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See O’Brien, supra note 3, at 60–66 (describing its interpretation by the Choctaw).
94. See Letter from John Woods to Edward Telfair, supra note 90.
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Hopewell—the white settlement was erased, at least semantically.95 As the
Choctaw Nation “[n]either Would hear, Or send, any More talks to the State
of Georgia,” Woods returned the state’s commission, nonetheless requesting
payment for four lost horses and other expenses.96
In accordance with the recognition of Congress and the Treaty, one of the
“great leading chiefs” of the Choctaw Nation, Tobocah, set off for
Congress.97 American newspapers repeatedly identified him as a Choctaw
king.98 Tobocah had been a signer at Hopewell but had spoken last, allegedly
“disgraced” for having taken a Spanish medal.99 Commissioner Joseph
Martin described Tobocah as having “always been sent by the Nation as their
representative in all their important Negotiations.”100 At Hopewell, Tobocah
described himself as “a headman in my Nation to receive and to give out
talks” and expressed the desire “to see Congress some days.”101 Freed from
Georgia’s authority, Woods accompanied him to Philadelphia.102
Also accompanying Tobocah was a woman described by white observers
as the “Queen” or “his Lady.”103 Her presence underscored the importance
of the diplomatic mission.104 Although women did not hold formal
leadership roles in the Choctaw Nation, their presence legitimized diplomatic
negotiations. On the two-month journey to Hopewell, ten women had
accompanied Tobocah and other chiefs and warriors.105 The Queen may
have been one of the women at Hopewell and, in any event, her presence
strengthened the official nature of the visit.
Tobocah and the Queen left the Choctaw Nation, likely by horseback, in
late November 1786.106 A king and queen traveling to Congress from the
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Philadelphia, June 15., supra note 1; Philadelphia, June 19., PA. PACKET &
DAILY ADVERTISER, June 19, 1787, at 3.
99. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 54 (quoting JOSEPH MARTIN, JOURNAL OF THE HOPEWELL
TREATIES 64 (1786) (available at the Draper Manuscript Collection, State Historical Society
of Wisconsin)).
100. Id. at 50 (quoting JOSEPH MARTIN, JOURNAL OF THE HOPEWELL TREATIES 64 (1786)
(available in the Draper Manuscript Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin)).
101. Id. (quoting JOSEPH MARTIN, JOURNAL OF THE HOPEWELL TREATIES 90 (1786)
(available in the Draper Manuscript Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin)).
102. Letter from John Woods to Edward Telfair, supra note 90; see Letter from Carlos de
Grand-Pré to Esteban Miró (Oct. 26, 1787), in SPAIN IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY, 1765–1794
pt. 2, at 236, 236–37 (Lawrence Kinnaird ed., 1946) (describing Fort Pitt travelers overhearing
the chief’s name as Py Omuttahan).
103. See, e.g., 15 MINUTES OF THE SUPREME EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF PENNSLYVANIA 228–
29 (Samuel Hazard ed., Harrisburg, Theo., Fenn & Co. 1853) (listing expenses related to the
“Choctaw King [and] his Queen”) [hereinafter COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA];
Philadelphia, June 19., supra note 98; Letter from John Woods, Indian Interpreter (May 25,
1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 76, at 290 (“[A] Cheif [sic] of
the Choctaw Indians, his Lady and a Chickasaw . . . .”). Unfortunately, I have not yet found
an identifying name for the Queen.
104. See Iti Fabussa, Early Political Structures, BISHINIK, Apr. 2010, at 9, 9.
105. See O’Brien, supra note 3, at 51.
106. See Letter from John Woods to Edward Telfair, supra note 90 (describing leaving in
late November).
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Choctaw Nation reinforced the exclusive authority of Congress over treaties
with “any King, Prince or state.”107 By January, when Woods wrote the
Georgia governor, the group had traveled through “the Chickasaws, thence
through the Creeks, thence into the Cherokees.”108 Two of those Nations
also had entered into Hopewell Treaty relationships. Tobocah sought other
deputies who likewise wanted reassurance of Congress’s commitment.
B. The Chickasaw Nation
The Chickasaw Nation chose a war captain named Muckleshamingo to
journey to Congress with Tobocah.109 Variously described as a “Chickasaw
captain” or “Chickasaw chief,” Muckleshamingo’s presence was approved
by the two prominent heads of the Nation: Chinnubee and Piomingo.110
Muckleshamingo carried a talk for Congress whose contents likely mirrored
a similar talk sent by Piomingo.111 The Chickasaw Nation worried about
white encroachment in violation of the Treaty. They were “sorry to hear that
the white People are settling all the lands Belonging to our Brothers, the
Cherokees.”112 The contrast between “white people” and “Brothers”
underscored the universal problem of white expansion. Piomongo added, “I
speak now for the Choctaws as well as my own People; we are all very uneasy
about it, as we are told the Americans Intend[] to take all our Country Before
they [are] Done.”113 Piomongo consistently contrasted “we” with “the
Americans.” Piomingo made clear that they hoped that “something will be
Done to prevent it,” otherwise “when all their lands Is settled our Lands will
go the same way.”114 And the possessive emphasis of “lands Belonging to”
and “our lands” insisted on territorial sovereignty. In addition, the
Chickasaw Nation was worried about the failure to increase trade as promised
under the Treaty.115 Piomingo wondered if “[y]ou only ment to Jockey us
out of our Lands.”116 The Nation wished “to hold you Fast”—that is, commit
to an exclusive relationship—but if Congress did not act, “necessity will

107. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1.
108. Id.
109. See Letter from Henry Knox to Chamby, Chickasaw Chief (June 27, 1787) (available
at the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) (naming
Muckleshamingo).
110. See 15 COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 103, at 228–29 (reporting
a bill of expenses referring to “a Chickasaw Captain”); Letter from Tobocah, Choctaw Chief
& a Chickasaw Captain to Benjamin Franklin (June 19, 1787) (available at the American
Philosophical Society Library). For previous speculations as to identity, see ARRELL M.
GIBSON, THE CHICKASAWS 85–86 (1971) (Piomingo); Flaherty, supra note 3, at 77
(Chinubbee, brother to Taskitetoka).
111. A Talk for Colo. Joseph Martin—from Piomingo, One of the Chiefs of That Tribe
(Feb. 15, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 76, at 241. I have not
been able to locate the talk given to Knox.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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oblige us to Look for new friends.”117 Congress had a choice: stop white
encroachment or the Nations would align with Spain.
After leaving the Chickasaw Nation, Tobocah, the Queen,
Muckleshamingo, and Woods may have traveled to the Creek Nation.118 But
no deputy from the Creek Nation appears to have joined the group. Instead,
information about the Creek Nation’s plan to move against Georgia traveled
with the delegation. By early 1787, the deputation was staying with
Governor Sevier at his home, Mount Pleasant (now in northeastern
Tennessee).119
They hoped to meet with James White, the new
superintendent of the southern department.120 But White seems not to have
appeared; indeed, he likely had begun to privately encourage the Spanish
minister Don Diego de Gardoqui to consider the possibility that the southern
states might break from the United States over the loss of the Mississippi.121
Sevier was quick to send on news of the visitors. To the Georgia governor,
Sevier described the group as having “set out for Congress in Order to
negociate national business.”122 Likewise, Arthur Campbell wrote the
Virginia governor that the group was “going to Congress to lay before them
the true state of affairs of the Southern Indians.”123 By late March, southern
governors knew the deputation planned to negotiate with Congress on behalf
of the “Southern Indians”—an apparently nearly united group, intriguingly
parallel to the northern United Indian Nations.
C. The Cherokee Nation
In early April when the deputation left for Philadelphia en route to New
York, no Cherokee Nation representative accompanied them.124 Woods had
urged Old Tassel to join but he declined.125 Old Tassel hoped to hear from
Congress through official channels. In March, Martin had arrived at the
Cherokee town of Chota and was told to write to the “Beloved men of
117. Id. For a discussion on trade, see David A. Nichols, The Enterprise of War: The
Military Economy of the Chickasaw Indians, 1715–1815, in THE NATIVE SOUTH: NEW
HISTORIES AND ENDURING LEGACIES 33 (Tim Alan Garrison & Greg O’Brien eds., 2017).
118. See Letter from Arthur Campbell to Edmund Randolph, supra note 76, at 254
(referring to a group including “the Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickassas”); Letter from John
Sevier to George Matthews (Mar. 3, 1787), in THE ANNALS OF TENNESSEE TO THE END OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 385 (J. G. M. Ramsey ed., Charleston, John Russell 1853) (describing
Tobocah coming “by way of the Creek Nation”); Letter from John Woods to Georgia
Governor (Mar. 3, 1787) (available at the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library,
University of Georgia) (describing a trip passing through Creek country).
119. See Letter from John Sevier to George Matthews, supra note 118.
120. See id.; see also Albert V. Goodpasture, Dr. James White. Pioneer, Politician,
Lawyer, 1 TENN. HIST. MAG. 282, 284 (1915).
121. KEVIN T. BARKSDALE, THE LOST STATE OF FRANKLIN: AMERICA’S FIRST SECESSION
105 (2009); DUVAL, supra note 14, at 315–16.
122. Letter from John Sevier to George Matthews, supra note 118.
123. Letter from Arthur Campbell to Edmund Randolph, supra note 76, at 254.
124. Letter from John Sevier to Benjamin Franklin (Apr. 9, 1787), in SAMUEL COLE
WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE LOST STATE OF FRANKLIN 165 (rev. ed. 1933).
125. A Talk Delivered Colo. Joseph Martin by the Old Corn Tassell (Mar. 25, 1787), in 22
THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 62, at 493.
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Congress.”126
Similarly, Old Tassel had urged Hawkins to “do
Something.”127 Thus, Old Tassel decided to “sett still till I hear from
Congress.”128
Nonetheless, in the meantime, the Cherokee Nation faced a crisis. Martin
“[f]ound the Indians in Greater Confusion Than I Ever saw them.”129 The
“pretended State of Franklin” was holding an assembly and opening a land
office to distribute Cherokee Nation land, including the “Beloved Town,
Chota.”130 Old Tassel’s talk confirmed the problem: the “Franklin people
are Settling all our Lands.”131 Martin concluded that the Franklinists were
taking “every step that appears most productive to a war” and that “nothing
will Remove” the white settlers “but an armed Force.”132 He was not alone
in worrying about an Indian war triggered by encroachment.133 The French
at Muscle Shoals spread rumors that the three European powers were joined
against the Americans with the Creeks and “Northward Indians” to “strike
this spring.”134 Old Tassel similarly hinted at an impending military
engagement with the Americans, on one side, and the Northward Indians, the
Creek, the Spanish, and the French, on the other.135
In addition to the issue of Franklin, Kentucky colonel John Logan, the
titular county sheriff, and a large militia group recently had killed at least
seven Cherokee. Details gradually emerged from letters sent to the Virginia
governor. The Kentucky people had killed some of the “friends” of “some
of the Chickamogga people.”136 In a letter filled with implicit scorn at the
inability to distinguish among Indians, Martin recounted how Logan had set
off against a “Crow Town” but “missing his way,” had killed seven
hunters.137 Another correspondent explained that Logan and around one
hundred men had set out to “attack and destroy a Small Town of the
Cherokees” whom they blamed for “depredations on the Kentucky-Path.”138
The seven people killed included a chief from “the friendly Towns.”139
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 494.
Letter from Joseph Martin to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 25, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF
VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 76, at 261, 261.
130. Letter from Joseph Martin to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 16, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF
VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 76, at 256, 256.
131. A Talk Delivered Colo. Joseph Martin by the Old Corn Tassell, supra note 125, at
493–94.
132. Letter from Joseph Martin to Edmund Randolph, supra note 130, at 256; Letter from
Joseph Martin to Edmund Randolph, supra note 129, at 261.
133. See Letter from Evan Shelby to William Russell (Apr. 27, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF
VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 76, at 274 (explaining the land office was taking “the
Lands Reserved to the Indians” and might end up with “Intestine War”).
134. A Talk Delivered Colo. Joseph Martin by the Old Corn Tassell, supra note 125, at
493–94.
135. Id.
136. Letter from Joseph Martin to Edmund Randolph, supra note 130, at 256.
137. Id.
138. Letter from Arthur Campbell to Edmund Randolph, supra note 76, at 254.
139. Id.; Letter from Arthur Campbell to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 17, 1787), in 4
CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 76, at 257, 257.
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Martin was told by the Cherokee Nation that “if the White People” let them
live in peace, “nothing will Induce them To Take up the Hatchett or Join the
Spaniards.”140 However, “if they are to be killed whenever they Go to Hunt,
they must have Satisfaction.”141
There were two talks to Congress sent with Martin, both emphasizing the
problem of white encroachment. The Cherokee Nation wanted Congress to
have “their people moved off our Lands.”142 Chief Hanging Maw explained,
“[w]e have held several treaties with the Americans” in which “[b]ounds was
always fixt and fair promises always made that the white people should not
come over.”143 In the past, he pointed out, “we always find that after a treaty
they Settle much faster than before.”144 But this time—at Hopewell—they
had “treated with Congress.”145 Congress was different from an individual
state and Hanging Maw believed that “we made no doubt but we should have
Justice.”146 Yet, the Cherokee Nation was being told that the Americans
meant to “deceive us” and they were beginning to “think it is true.”147
Although Martin left Chota to head in theory towards Congress, Old Tassel
and Hanging Maw decided to send their own deputy by another route. They
needed someone important enough to be treated as a representative, yet who
would not undermine the official channel hopefully represented by Martin
and Hawkins. They chose a young man, Sconetoyah, described by
newspapers as the “brave young Warrior Sconetoyah, an Indian Chief of the
Cherokee Nation.”148 He was “a War Captain and son to one of the principal
Chiefs of that nation.”149 In fact, Sconetoyah was the son of Katteuha, the
Beloved Woman of Chota, the most important female political leader, and he
carried a talk to Congress from her.150 Later that summer, Benjamin Franklin
complimented Katteuha on “having so good a Son.”151 Striking a personal
tone, Franklin hoped that she would have the “Benefit of his Support when

140.
141.
142.
143.

Letter from Joseph Martin to Edmund Randolph, supra note 129, at 261.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Talk Delivered by Hanging Maw to Joseph Martin (Mar. 24, 1787), in 22 THE STATE
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 62, at 492, 493.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Baltimore, June 12., MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, June 12, 1787.
149. Philadelphia, June 14., INDEP. GAZETTEER, June 14, 1787.
150. See HOIG, supra note 3, at 70 (brief mention); Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the
Cherokee Indian Queen (June 30, 1787) (available at the Library of Congress) (“I have seen
your Letter to the Congress.”).
151. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Cherokee Indian Queen, supra note 150.
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you grow old.”152 Accompanying Sconetoyah was Alexander Dromgoole, a
trader-interpreter, possibly a relative of Old Tassel by marriage.153
In April, as the two groups moved toward Philadelphia, news of the
impending Convention mingled with the volatile western situation.
Governor Edmund Randolph worried that he had overstepped the Articles of
Confederation by sending a talk to the Cherokee leaders.154 He explained
that the “Cherokees have begun to be troublesome in our country” so he had
to “direct some soothing steps to be taken on the part of Virginia” by sending
the talk.155 Indeed, Randolph tried but failed to get state attorney general
Harry Innes to prosecute Logan for the murders.156
In mid-April, Congress finally received the talks from Old Tassel and
Hanging Maw that were sent in September 1786.157 The committee on
Indian affairs, headed by James Madison, took up the stated concerns but
they seemed not to be a priority. In addition to preparing for the Convention,
Madison spent the spring addressing British accusations of state violations of
the Treaty of Peace and trying to prevent John Jay from relinquishing
American navigation of the Mississippi in negotiations with the Spanish.158
Madison probably left New York for Philadelphia before his committee gave
a report on May 8 about the Cherokee Nation’s complaints (the report has
never been located).159 The next day, May 9, an ordinance for “the
government of the Western Territory” was read for a second time, then
postponed before its final reading on May 10.160 As delegates left for
Philadelphia, Congress lost its quorum on May 11 and was not expected to
reconvene until after the Convention.161
Throughout May, deep concern about white encroachment continued to
spread, joined by news of meetings—conventions—of Native Nations. The
southern department superintendent, James White, warned Knox that
increased encroachments would lead to violence. As he put it, “the white
people on the frontier” were “continuing their encroachments” and extending

152. Id.; see TRANSATLANTIC FEMINISMS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 178–83 (Lisa L.
Moore et al. eds., 2012); cf. M. Amanda Moulder, “By Women, You Were Brought Forth into
This World”: Cherokee Women’s Oratorical Education in the Late Eighteenth Century, in
RHETORIC, HISTORY, AND WOMEN’S ORATORICAL EDUCATION: AMERICAN WOMEN LEARN TO
SPEAK 19 (David Gold & Catherine L. Hobbs eds., 2013).
153. HOIG, supra note 3, at 70 (stating Dromgoole may have “married a sister of Corn
Tassel’s nephew, John Watts Kunoskekie”).
154. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Virginia Delegates (Apr. 4, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 366, 366.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 366 n.1.
158. See GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS,
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 159 (2010).
159. James Madison, Notes on Debates in Congress (Apr. 26, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 407, 407; Letter from Edmund Randolph to Virginia
Delegates, supra note 154.
160. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 274–75, 283.
161. Id. at 292.
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“their surveys into the Indian country.”162 White noted “[t]he natural
reluctance of the Indians to part with any of their lands; for, to use their
expression, they look on their lands as their blood and their life, which they
must fight for rather than part with.”163 The Georgia governor was informed
of a “Convention” of “Nations to the North and West.”164 Unless white
encroachment halted, war appeared inevitable and understandable.165
Although Congress had created a regulatory division based on the Ohio
River, there appears to have been movement toward a unified western
response by Native Nations against white encroachment. The Chickasaw
Nation gathered in a general meeting to discuss a convention of “all
Nations.”166 A continental confederation of Native Nations would be a
formidable opposition to the tenuous confederation of states.
III. PHILADELPHIA
Throughout May, newspapers reported the progress of the two deputations.
By mid-May, Sconetoyah was in Winchester.167 By the end of the month,
the “Prince of the Cherokee Nation” passed through Fredericksburg168 and
Tobocah, the Queen, and Muckleshamingo passed through
Charlottesville.169 Word spread about their progress as they applied to
Virginia and Maryland for funds to complete their journeys.170 Only on June
12 did Sconetoyah reach Philadelphia, followed by the second deputation on
June 18. Although intending to travel on to New York and to Congress, both
groups turned back toward their homes after staying in Philadelphia for
several weeks.

162. Letter from James White to Henry Knox (May 24, 1787), in DOCUMENTS AND OTHER
PAPERS RELATING TO THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE STATES OF GEORGIA AND FLORIDA
16 (Washington, Beverley Tucker 1855). For more concerns on these hostilities, see Letter
from Henry Knox to George Washington (July 6, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 123 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1989).
163. Letter from James White to Henry Knox, supra note 162, at 18.
164. Letter from William Davenport to the Governor of Georgia (May 27, 1787) (available
at the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Frederick-Town, May 30. Extract of a Letter from Winchester, May 26, 1787, supra
note 75.
168. Frederick-Town, June 6, MD. CHRON. OR UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, June 6, 1787
(noting a Cherokee prince passing through on “Wednesday last”).
169. See Frederick-Town, May 30. Extract of a Letter from Winchester, May 26, 1787,
supra note 75.
170. In Annapolis, they stopped because they were “without money.” Woods applied for
a supply “to pay for their Passages from Richmond to the Head of the Elk and to take them to
as far as Philadelphia.” Letter from Thomas Harwood to Delegates in Congress (June 14,
1787) (available at the Maryland State Archives).
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A. Treaty Supremacy
When the Convention began in late May, Governor Randolph’s opening
speech promoted expansive national power over the states.171 His earlier
view that the general government had exclusive authority over relations with
Native Nations seemingly was confirmed in the Virginia delegation’s draft
plan to give the national legislature authority well beyond that of the current
Congress and to legislate wherever the states were “incompetent” or when
national legislation was needed to ensure the “harmony of the United
States.”172 The national legislature seemed ready to rebuff Georgia’s
repeated efforts to insist on its own authority over Native Nations. There was
to be a national legislative negative, or veto, on all state laws “contravening
in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union.”173
Similarly, the states were “bound by oath to support the articles of Union.”174
The national legislature was also to be authorized “to call forth the force of
the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the
articles thereof.”175
In justifying Virginia’s plan, Randolph blamed the misguided optimism of
the Articles, which resulted in the current instability. As he put it, at that
earlier point, “treaties had not been violated.”176 Randolph’s repeated
concern about the western boundary seemed an overt reference to the recent
Hopewell Treaties. These violations established that a different approach
was required substantively and linguistically. Indeed, for some delegates, the
plan was not sufficiently explicit about state exclusion from treaties. Almost
immediately, Benjamin Franklin made sure that the national supremacy
included treaties. He proposed that states were bound to support “any
Treaties subsisting under the authority of the union.”177 Apparently there
was unanimous approval.178 National treaty supremacy was a foundational
principle within the Convention’s early consensus.
As the Convention delegates guaranteed national treaty supremacy, a
widely reprinted newspaper account described the impending Native
171. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 58, 180–81 (2015) (discussing Randolph’s speech notes transmitted to Madison
in 1789).
172. 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 244. I am not persuaded by a recent claim that the Virginia
Plan was to have included an Indian affairs provision as sent to the Committee of Detail, nor
that any such absence reflected the intentional omission of an enumerated power as opposed
to the assumption of implied congressional power. See generally Lorianne Updike Toler, The
Missing Indian Affairs Clause, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (2021).
173. 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 244.
174. Id. at 245.
175. Id. at 244.
176. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 15 (May 29,
1787).
177. Convention Journal (May 31, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 47 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]; see
also McHenry’s Notes (May 31, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 60.
178. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 33 (May 31, 1787)
(reflecting a later addition by Madison based on the Convention Journal); see also id. at 56
(June 4, 1787) (recounting Franklin reminding delegates of western violence).
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Nation’s visits to be about compliance with the Hopewell Treaties and the
prevention of white encroachment. This account began with the Cherokee
Nation chief and ended with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. The
purpose was to discuss the Hopewell Treaties with Congress. In between,
the account summarized various examples of disputes arising from white
encroachment in the western territories. It is useful to reprint the article in
full as it appeared in New York and Philadelphia newspapers:
Last evening arrived here, Mr. Alexander Dromgoole, on his way to
Congress, with an Indian Chief, one of the Cherokee nation, who will
remain in town a few days. We are told that this Chief’s business is
principally concerning a treaty held at Hopewell, on the Keowee, between
the Commissioners of the united states of America, and the head men and
warriors of the Cherokee Nation. By this gentleman we are informed, that
the Creek nation are encouraged to war against the settlements of Georgia
and Cumberland, and it is said that all their towns at this time, are supplied
with large quantities of powder and lead, by the Spaniards, for that purpose.
It is also said, that the northern Indians are all determined to take up the
hatchet this summer, in retaliation for the depredations committed by the
Kentucky people in burning their towns last fall. That there have been some
French traders at the Muscle Shoals, on the Tenessee river, last winter
trading from Detroit, who have been encouraging the Cherokees to go to
war, but they pay little attention to their council.
By late accounts from Kentucky it appears, that five persons have lately
been killed by the Indians on the north side, among whom were a son and
overseer of Gen. Scott’s, who were out on a fowling party. That three
women were killed in a place called the Rich Valley, near the head of
Holston, and many others killed on the waters of Clinch. Several of the
Indians have been seen near the great road that leads from Holston to
Winchester, which has alarmed the people very much.
By a gentleman from Charlottesville, we are told, that there is a Choctaw
Chief, and a Chickesaw, on their way to Congress; they passed through that
town about the 20th of May.179

Reading between the lines, the actions of settlers in Georgia, Cumberland,
North Carolina, and Kentucky, Virginia, were bringing the United States to
the brink of great violence. To uphold treaty relationships between the

179. Extract of a Letter from Baltimore, dated June 1., DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), June 8,
1787; Baltimore, May 29., INDEP. GAZETTEER OR CHRON. OF FREEDOM , June 8, 1787; Extract
of a Letter from a Gentleman in Norfolk, to His Friend in Petersburgh, N.Y. PACKET, June 8,
1787; Baltimore, May 29., PA. MERCURY & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, June 8, 1787; Baltimore,
June 1., PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, June 8, 1787; Extract of a Letter from Washington,
County, Rhode-Island, Dated May 1787, INDEP. J. OR GEN. ADVERTISER, June 9, 1787; From
the Baltimore Gazette, of June 4, N.J.J. & POL. INTELLIGENCER, June 13, 1787. A shorter
version appeared elsewhere. See, e.g., New-York, State. New-York, June 9. Extract of a Letter
from Baltimore, Dated June 1, 2 N.H. SPY, 273, 275 (1787); Summary of Late Intelligence,
MASS. SPY, June 21, 1787; New-York, June 8, U.S. CHRON., June 21, 1787; Albany, June 14,
VT. GAZETTE, June 25, 1787; June 8., CUMBERLAND GAZETTE, June 28, 1787; Baltimore, June
1., COLUMBIAN HERALD, July 2, 1787. An earlier version appeared in Frederick-Town, May
30. Extract of a Letter from Winchester, May 26, 1787, supra note 75.
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United States and the Native Nations might prevent a European-backed
Indian war.
In contrast to this possible violent path was a path of political friendship
between Native Nations and the United States. As Sconetoyah neared
Philadelphia, another reprinted article cast him as the “Friend of the United
States.”180 In Baltimore, he had been welcomed and showed “an exquisite
Sensibility of Mind”:
During his Stay in this Town, tho’ an untutored Son of Nature, he behaved
with the Propriety of a civilized Citizen, and deservedly gained the
Attention of many respectable Americans and Foreigners, who entertained
him with the greatest Hospitality. His Gratitude was manifested, on these
Occasions, in a Manner expressive of an exquisite Sensibility of Mind, and
he appeared to obey the strong Impulse of lively Gratitude, at the Moment
of his Departure, in requesting that “the hearty Thanks of SCONETOYAH,
the Friend of the United States,” might be presented, thro’ the Channel of
this Paper, “to the generous Inhabitants and great Warriors of
Baltimore.”181

The newspaper account sought to reassure white readers that coexistence was
possible. The Cherokee chief—romanticized as the “untutored Son of
Nature”—had behaved “with the Propriety of a civilized Citizen.” The
hospitality provided by “many respectable Americans,” as well as the “lively
Gratitude” of Sconetoyah, presented an acceptable option for white
Americans. The term “friend”—a word signaling both the chain of
friendship of treaties and perhaps also alluding to the “firm league of
friendship” of the states described in the Articles of Confederation—carried
political symbolism.182
Inside the Philadelphia Convention, the delegates continued to meet as a
Committee of the Whole House and to accept general government authority
relating to treaties. In the discussion of the proposed legislative negative,
state violations of treaties figured prominently.183 Georgia’s practice of
linguistic caviling under the Articles seemed to motivate further decisions.
Its attempt to claim that Native Nations were members of the state of Georgia
was blocked by a substituted rule of representation. That rule explicitly
excluded “Indians not paying taxes.”184 Membership in the state thus would
be determined by volitional tax paying, not geographical location. Only if
Indians chose to pay taxes could the state count them. In brief, the rule barred
the states from unilaterally incorporating the members of Native Nations
through state legislation. As the Convention approached the completion of
180. Baltimore, June 12., MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, June 12, 1787.
181. Id.; Baltimore, (Maryland) June 12., 2 N.H. SPY, 281, 283 (1787); America.
Maryland., SALEM MERCURY, June 26, 1787; New-York, June 18., AM. HERALD, July 2, 1787;
From the Maryland Journal, Printed by William Goddard, VT. GAZETTE, July 2, 1787.
182. 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at, 86.
183. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 88 (June 8, 1787)
(recounting Pinckney and Madison arguing for a universal negative by emphasizing states’
violation of treaties).
184. Id. at 107.
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its committee draft, state authority to treat with Native Nations appeared
decisively prohibited.
B. Washington’s Handshake
On Tuesday, June 12, Sconetoyah arrived at the Indian King Tavern in
Philadelphia, where he and Dromgoole stayed until July 1.185 The
Philadelphia newspapers covered Sconetoyah’s movements over the next
several days, repeatedly emphasizing his goal to ensure observance of the
Treaty against white encroachment.186 As the Independent Gazetteer
reported on June 14, Sconetoyah planned to present grievances to Congress
and to demand observance of the Hopewell Treaty, “which they say has been
violated and infringed by the lawless and unruly whites on the frontiers.”187
The same report added, “We are informed that a Choctaw King, and a
Chickasaw Chief, are also on their way to New-York, to have a Talk with
Congress, and to brighten the chain of friendship.”188 This account was
reprinted far beyond Philadelphia throughout the month.189
The day after Sconetoyah arrived, the Convention heard the completed
Report of the Committee of the Whole House.190 This June 13 report
established extensive national powers in Congress and included a negative
over state laws that contravened, in Congress’s opinion, “any treaties
subsisting under the authority of the Union.”191 In addition, the states were
barred from claiming Native Nations within their jurisdiction through the
exclusion of “Indians not paying taxes in each State” from the ratio of
representation.192 The Convention immediately postponed discussion and
adjourned.193
185. See 15 COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 103, at 238 (paying Sidney
Paul, proprietor of the Indian King Tavern); Late 18th Century Philadelphia, Block by Block:
Market (or High) Street, EARLY PHILA., http://www.philahistory.net/market.html
[https://perma.cc/KUK5-2VFE] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
186. See Philadelphia, June 14., supra note 149; Philadelphia, June 15., supra note 1;
Philadelphia, June 18., INDEP. GAZETTEER OR CHRON. OF FREEDOM, June 18, 1787;
Philadelphia, June 20., FREEMAN’S J. OR N. AM. INTELLIGENCER, June 20, 1787; Extract of a
Letter from a Gentleman in Rhode-Island, to His Friend in This City, Dated June 7., PA.
GAZETTE, June 20, 1787.
187. Philadelphia, June 15., supra note 1. The New York newspapers followed suit. See
New-York, June 18., DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), June 18, 1787; Philadelphia, June 16., INDEP.
J. OR GEN. ADVERTISER, June 20, 178; Philadelphia, June 14., N.Y.J & WEEKLY REG., June
21, 1787.
188. Philadelphia, June 15., supra note 1.
189. See, e.g., New-York, June 19., N.Y. PACKET, June 19, 1787; Philadelphia, June 16.,
supra note 187; Intelligence by Last Mails: Philadelphia, June 15., 7 MASS. CENTINEL, 109,
110 (1787); Philadelphia, June 16., AM. HERALD, June 25, 1787; Philadelphia, June 15., AM.
MERCURY (Hartford), June 25, 1787; Philadelphia, June 13., WEEKLY MONITOR (Litchfield),
June 25, 1787; Savanna, May 10., ESSEX J. & N.H. PACKET, June 27, 1787; Pennsylvania:
Philadelphia, June 15., N.H. MERCURY & GEN. ADVERTISER, June 28, 1787.
190. See Convention Journal (June 13, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177,
at 223, 232–33.
191. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 121.
192. Id.
193. See Convention Journal (June 13, 1787), supra note 190, at 223.
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Following adjournment, the delegates met publicly with Sconetoyah. As
the newspaper recounted: “Sconetoyah, a warrior of the Cherokee nation,
sent with a letter to Congress by the king of that nation, conducted by Mr.
Dromgoole, was introduced to his Excel. Alex. Martin, late Governor of
North-Carolina, and a number of the gentlemen members of the
Convention.”194 This emphasis was intended to send a message. The
representative of the king of the Cherokee Nation, Sconetoyah, met the
former governor of the state that refused to recognize the Cherokee
boundaries. In addition to this public meeting with Martin, Sconetoyah met
a “number of the gentlemen Members of the Convention.”195 Here again,
the Cherokee Nation’s treaty concerns intertwined with the Convention’s
work on a new constitution.
Of even greater significance, Sconetoyah met George Washington at the
Pennsylvania State House. Always referred to as “the General,” Washington
signified the United States and the Convention of which he was president.
The location of the meeting at the State House suggested an official
diplomatic event. The discussion took place within the norms of diplomatic
courtesy. Thus, Washington expressed concern regarding the health of “the
King and all his people.”196 The newspapers described the meeting in detail
and emphasized the handshake between Washington and Sconetoyah:
[He] was from thence conducted to the State-House, where he had the
honor of taking his Excellency General Washington by the hand. The
General said he was glad to see him, and hoped he left the King and all his
people well when he came from home, which he answered and said he did.
He also asked him his business to Congress, which he told the General, it
was chiefly respecting the white people incroaching on their lands. The
general took him by the hand, and bid him farewell; wished him great
success in his business, and a safe return to the nation, that he might find
all his people well when he returned.197

194. Philadelphia, June 16., PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, June 16, 1787 [hereinafter
Packet: Philadelphia, June 16.]; Philadelphia, June 18., supra note 186; Extract of a Letter
from a Gentleman in Rhode-Island, to His Friend in This City, Dated June 7., supra note 186;
Philadelphia, June 14., N.Y.J. & PATRIOTIC REG., June 21, 1787; Philadelphia, June 18.,
DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), June 22, 1787; Philadelphia, June 18., CONN. J., June 27, 1787
[hereinafter Journal: Philadelphia, June 18.]; Philadelphia, June 18., 7 MASS. CENTINEL,
113, 114 (1787) [hereinafter Centinel: Philadelphia June 18.]; Philadelphia, June 20.,
POUGHKEEPSIE J., June 27, 1787; Philadelphia, June 20., N.J.J. & POL. INTELLIGENCER, June
27, 1787 [hereinafter Journal: Philadelphia, June 20.]; Philadelphia, (Pennsylvania) June
14., 2 N.H. SPY, 285, 286 (1787); Philadelphia, June 16., PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY
J., June 30, 1787 [hereinafter Gazette: Philadelphia, June 16.]; From the Maryland Journal,
Printed by William Goddard, supra note 181; Philadelphia, June 20., MASS. GAZETTE, July
3, 1787; Pennsylvania., SALEM MERCURY, July 3, 1787; Philadelphia, June 20., MD. CHRON.
OR UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, July 4, 1787 [hereinafter Chronicle: Philadelphia, June 20.];
Philadelphia, June 20., NEWPORT HERALD, July 5, 1787 [hereinafter Herald: Philadelphia,
June 20.]; Summary of Late Intelligence, MASS. SPY, July 5, 1787; Philadelphia, July 11.,
COLUMBIAN HERALD, July 23, 1787.
195. See Philadelphia, June 18., supra note 186.
196. Id.; Packet: Philadelphia, June 16., supra note 194.
197. Packet: Philadelphia, June 16., supra note 194.
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Washington shook hands—a pledge of faith—once in greeting and once in
parting. The newspaper described Sconetoyah instigating the first handshake
and Washington instigating the second. The meeting thus appeared to be the
diplomatic meeting of representatives of two sovereign nations.198
The two men carried on a public conversation about the fundamental
problem of white encroachment. As the newspapers described, the primary
business concerned “white people incroaching on their lands.”199 Indeed, in
asking that Sconetoyah state his “business to Congress,” Washington
provided an opportunity for a public presentation. Sconetoyah’s response
emphasized the Cherokee Nation’s insistence on retaining “their land.”200
The problem was therefore simple: “white people incroaching.”201 In
response, not only did Washington shake Sconetoyah’s hand, but he “wished
him great success in his business”—suggesting approval of his mission.202
Indeed, Washington’s wishes for a “safe return” and to “find all his people
well” may have been gesturing at the white racial violence against the
Cherokee that spring.203 The performance of the handshake between
Sconetoyah and Washington appeared to be a confirmation of the Hopewell
Treaty’s promises to respect Native Nation land.
This dramatic public meeting constituted only the most public of the
meetings between Sconetoyah and Convention members and congressional
delegates. The newspaper noted, “Since he arrived in this city, there has been
every mark of friendship shewn to him, and he has frequently had the honor
to dine with several of the Members of Congress and Convention.”204
Another key meeting occurred between Sconetoyah and Virginia governor
Edmund Randolph. According to Randolph, the “Cherokee chief” came with
an interpreter to meet him.205 Either the chief or the interpreter “urged”
Randolph to “send a talk and a present.”206 With his usual fretfulness over
the boundaries of his authority, Randolph explained that he “could not
refuse.”207 He sent a silver pipe “with some symbols of Virginia and
Cherokee friendship.”208 Patronizingly, Randolph described the pipe as “an
ornament to the townhouse of the Indians” and a medal to “conciliate the
chief.”209 In addition, Randolph apparently sent back talks.210 Presumably,

198. See sources cited supra note 196; see also John Ray, George Washington’s Prepresidential Statesmanship, 1783–1789, 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 207, 207–18 (1997).
199. See sources cited supra note 196.
200. See sources cited supra note 196.
201. See sources cited supra note 196.
202. See sources cited supra note 196.
203. See sources cited supra note 196.
204. See sources cited supra note 196.
205. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Beverly Randolph (July 12, 1787), reprinted in A
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 165
(James H. Hutson, ed. 1987).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id.
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Randolph sought to reassure the Cherokee Nation that his state would respect
the Hopewell Treaty.
In some newspaper accounts of Washington’s handshake and the
conversation, the report appeared in sections discussing the Convention.211
Considerable reprinting occurred over the summer.212 On September 8,
1787, even the Georgia Gazette published the handshake account underneath
a notice that the Convention was nearing completion of its work.213
Although Sconetoyah never set foot inside the Convention, his visit was
interwoven with the work of the Convention.
C. Compelling Observance of Treaties
In the immediate wake of the handshake, the New Jersey delegates drafted
an alternative plan to the Committee Report.214 The New Jersey Plan
proposed a model more closely aligned with specific problems arising under
the Articles. Yet as with the Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan guaranteed
the general government’s authority with respect to Native Nations. Acts of
the United States in Congress made in the past (under the Articles) and future
were “supreme law of the respective States.”215 The New Jersey Plan
incorporated the concern that treaty authority be affirmed and made explicit:
“all Treaties made & ratified under the authority” of the United States were
supreme law.216 Congress was given broad power to “pass Acts for the
regulation of trade & commerce as well with foreign nations as with each
other.”217 And importantly, the federal judiciary was given jurisdiction in
cases “in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any
of the Acts for regulation of trade.”218 This approach shifted disputes over
treaties and trade to the federal judiciary. By specifying a federal judicial
arbiter, the New Jersey Plan sought to bar North Carolina and Georgia from
judging their own authority.
Strikingly, the New Jersey Plan authorized national enforcement to stop
white encroachment. Article 6 addressed situations where a state “or any
body of men in any State” opposed or prevented “carrying into execution”
acts or treaties.219 In such a situation, the “federal Executive” was authorized
to “call forth the power of the Confederated States.”220 The aim was to
“enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts, or an Observance of such

211. See, e.g., Summary of Late Intelligence, supra note 194; Centinel: Philadelphia, June
18., supra note 194; Herald: Philadelphia, June 20., supra note 194; Gazette: Philadelphia,
June 16., supra note 194.
212. See supra note 196.
213. Philadelphia, July 28., GA. ST. GAZETTE OR INDEP. REG., Sept. 8, 1787.
214. The New Jersey Amendments to the Articles of Confederation (June 15, 1787), in 1
DHRC, supra note 15, at 250.
215. Id. at 252–53 (article 6).
216. Id. (article 6).
217. Id. at 251 (article 2).
218. Id. at 252 (article 5).
219. Id. (article 6).
220. Id. at 253 (article 6).
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Treaties.”221 Observance of treaties was to be compelled through a new
enforcement mechanism.222
The delegates instantly grasped this difference regarding enforcement
between the two plans. As New York delegate Robert Yates noted, the New
Jersey Plan gave “power to the executive to compel obedience by force,” as
opposed to merely negativing a state law.223 Massachusetts delegate Rufus
King’s summary made the use of force almost a duty when faced with treaty
opposition, stating, “The Acts Treaties &c &c to be paramount to State Laws
and when any State or body of men opposed Treaties or general Laws, the
Executive to call forth the force of the Union to enforce the Treaty or
Law.”224 James Wilson described the provision as “[t]he Right to call out
the force of the Union.”225 As Rufus King’s summary underscored,
compelled observance extended to any “body of men”—a phrase that likely
brought to mind settlements such as the State of Franklin.226 Moreover, the
New Jersey Plan removed the decision about the use of compelled force from
Congress.
The executive became the decision maker over treaty
enforcement. In the context of the demands of the Native Nations that the
Hopewell Treaties be honored and white encroachment ended, the New
Jersey Plan suggested willingness to use the general government’s military
power on the side of Native Nations and against white settlers if necessary.
As North Carolina governor Alexander Martin had recognized earlier that
spring with respect to the Franklin settlers, “nothing will Remove them but
an armed Force.”227
Alexander Hamilton’s lengthy speech on Monday, June 18 echoed the
robust treaty-focused stance of the New Jersey Plan. The executive and the
Senate would have the “power of making all treaties,” Hamilton declared,
and they would control the departments on war and foreign affairs, as well as
nominate ambassadors to foreign nations.228 Contrary state laws were to be
“utterly void” and state governors would be appointed by the “general
Government.”229 Similarly, state militias were to be controlled by the
general government, with their officers also appointed by the general
government.230 In short, Hamilton recommended an approach similar to that
of the British government.
It is likely that even as Hamilton gave his speech, Tobocah, the Queen, and
Muckleshamingo arrived in Philadelphia. Along with Dromgoole, they
221. Id. (article 6).
222. Id. at 252–53 (article 6).
223. Yates Notes (June 16, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177, at
257, 260.
224. Yates Notes (June 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177, at
246, 247.
225. Yates Notes (June 16, 1787), supra note 223, at 265.
226. See Yates Notes (June 15, 1787), supra note 224, at 247.
227. Letter from Joseph Martin to Edmund Randolph, supra note 129, at 261.
228. Madison Notes (June 18, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177,
at 282, 292 (recounting Hamilton’s speech).
229. Id. at 293.
230. Id.
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stayed at the Cross Keys Inn until July 5.231 They too intended to ensure an
end to white encroachment. As the newspapers noted, they had been
“appointed to see the articles of the treaty made at Hopewel Senaca, in the
state of South Carolina, by the representatives of their nations and the
commissioners of the United States, ratified and made good.”232
Immediately upon their arrival, they wrote Benjamin Franklin requesting his
assistance and “Directions to proceed to their Business.”233
Inside the Convention, James Madison seemed to reference the presence
of four members of Native Nations the very next day. On June 19, Madison
gave the only speech that scholars identify as explicitly referring to the
“Indians,” in the course of his argument seeking approval of the Committee’s
Report.234 Worried perhaps that the New Jersey and Hamilton plans might
create the impression that the Committee Report was sympathetic to white
encroachment, Madison firmly condemned “encroachments on the federal
authority.”235 His use of the word “encroachments” cleverly connoted
jurisdictional violations of the general government’s authority in any number
of cases, while also hinting at the specific instance of physical encroachments
of Native Nation territory protected under the general government’s treaty
authority. Madison more explicitly referenced exclusive congressional
authority over matters relating to Native Nations. He stated, “By the federal
articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Congs.”236 Even without
expansion of congressional jurisdiction, Madison insisted that Congress
controlled under the existing Articles.237 In brief, Congress had full and
complete authority in relations with Native Nations.
Madison condemned state violations of treaties and singled out Georgia.
As he explained, “Yet in several instances, the States have entered into
treaties & wars with them.”238 Robert Yates recalled Madison’s statement
of the problem more dramatically. He said that the “confederated states” had

231. See 15 COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 102, at 240 (paying Israel
Israel, proprietor of the Cross Keys Inn); see also Robert Earle Graham, The Taverns of
Colonial Philadelphia, 43 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 318, 324 (1953).
232. Philadelphia, June 19., supra note 98; American Intelligence: Philadelphia, June 20.,
INDEP. GAZETTEER OR CHRON. OF FREEDOM, June 20, 1787; American Intelligence:
Philadelphia, June 20., PA. HERALD & GEN. ADVERTISER, June 20, 1787; Philadelphia, June
20., supra note 186; Philadelphia, June 22., PA. MERCURY & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, June
22, 1787; Philadelphia, June 20., INDEP. J. OR GEN. ADVERTISER, June 23, 1787; Philadelphia,
June 23., CARLISLE GAZETTE & W. REPOSITORY OF KNOWLEDGE, June 27, 1787; Journal:
Philadelphia, June 18., supra note 194; Philadelphia, June 20., MASS. GAZETTE, June 29,
1787; Gazette: Philadelphia, June 16., supra note 194; Journal: Philadelphia, June 20.,
supra note 194; Chronicle: Philadelphia, June 20., supra note 194 (with Sconetoyah
paragraph); Philadelphia, July 11., supra note 194 (with Sconetoyah paragraph).
233. Letter from Tobocah, Choctaw Chief & a Chickasaw Captain to Benjamin Franklin,
supra note 110.
234. Madison Notes (June 19, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177,
at 312, 316 (Madison’s speech).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 314–15.
238. Id. at 316 & n.7 (noting that “in question Georgia” was crossed out).
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“power” (meaning capacity) “to violate treaties.”239 Yates recollected, “Has
not Georgia, in direct violation of the confederation made war with the
Indians, and concluded treaties?”240 According to King, Madison had
forcefully denounced Georgia’s illegitimate interpretation that “Georgia has
declared & prosecuted a war agt. the Indians—they have treated with
them.”241 The word “treated” was the verb to form a treaty—and Madison
left no doubt that Georgia’s actions in treating and declaring war were
illegitimate under the Articles. The Committee Report only reinforced that
exclusion.
Cleverly, Madison then played on fears that white settlers’ encroachment
would lead to an Indian war. He warned about a future in which the Franklin
or Kentucky settlers achieved statehood. If the New Jersey Plan were
adopted, the “prospect of many new States to the Westward”—each with an
equal vote—would create “a more objectionable minority than ever might
give law to the whole.”242 Allowed to create a state “minority” voting bloc,
white settlers in western territories would bring the nation to the brink of war
with Native Nations.243
Beyond establishing that every plan affirmed exclusive general
government treaty authority, the visits by the Native Nations deputies
apparently focused Madison’s thinking about the United States as a
confederation. They suggested that if the United States breached the
Hopewell Treaties and failed to repair the relationship, then Native Nations
would turn to Spain. Madison’s June 19 speech noted that, according to the
“Expositors of the law of Nations,” a breach of any one article by a part leaves
people to consider it “dissolved”—that is, “unless they choose rather to
compel the delinquent party to repair the breach.”244 From this principle,
Madison drew the further conclusion that the United States should not be
analogized to a confederation.245 If the states imagined themselves as
sovereign, then they too could threaten to align with Spain. (One wonders if
Madison had heard rumors to that effect.) With the conclusion of Madison’s
speech, the delegates voted on the Committee Report. Although New Jersey,
Delaware, and New York dissented, the other delegations voted in favor.246
D. The Friendship and Justice of the United States
While the Convention completed these deliberations, three significant
political figures in Indian affairs left New York for Philadelphia. Secretary
239. Id. at 326 (recounting Yates’s speech).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 330 (recounting King’s speech).
242. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 162 (June 19,
1787).
243. See id. As the delegates went on to consider the first resolution, King declared that
the states were not sovereigns and could not make treaties. See id. at 163.
244. Id. at 153 (continuing to discuss treaties).
245. See id.
246. Madison Notes (June 19, 1787), supra note 234, at 322 (noting that Maryland was
divided).
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at War Henry Knox arrived around June 14 or 15 and left around June 30.247
North Carolina representative William Blount took his seat at the Convention
on June 20.248 And, accompanying Blount was his fellow North Carolina
congressional delegate and Hopewell Treaties commissioner Benjamin
Hawkins.249 Although Hawkins initially intended to continue south after
reaching Philadelphia, by early July, he and Blount returned to New York to
give Congress an unanticipated quorum. The Native Nations’ presence in
Philadelphia raised concerns with the Spanish envoy, Diego de Gardoqui. By
June 22, he was relaying this information to relevant Spanish officials in
Louisiana and, before the Convention adjourned, he would himself journey
to Philadelphia.250
For the two North Carolina representatives, the deputies’ visits confirmed
the problem of treaty infractions by whites. According to Blount, the
Cherokee Nation deputy “complained loudly against the infractions of the
Treaty at Hopewell in as much as that the whites had settled with in a few
miles of their towns and within that part assigned them by the State of
N.Ca.”251 Blount added, “I could wish the whites had for born their
settlements on that part.”252 For Hawkins, the white encroachments betrayed
the Hopewell Treaty. Hawkins explained to Jefferson that the Treaties
showed “how attentive I have been to the rights of these people” and that
there was “nothing I have more at heart than the preservation of them.”253
247. See Letter from William Knox to Henry Knox (June 14, 1787) (available at the Gilder
Lehrman Institute of American History); Letter from William Knox to Henry Knox (June 28,
1787) (available at the Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History) (discussing Henry
Knox’s travel plans to and from New York).
248. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 166 (June 20,
1787).
249. Letter from William Blount to Richard Caswell (July 19, 1787), in 24 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 362 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1996).
250. See ALCÉE FORTIER, 2 THE SPANISH DOMINATION AND THE CESSION TO THE UNITED
STATES 126–27 (1904); Letter from Esteban Miró to José Manuel de Ezpeleta (Apr. 1, 1788)
(available at the Mississippi Department of Archives & History) (enclosing Letter from Henry
Knox, to Chamby, supra note 109)); Letter from Henry Knox to James White (June 28, 1787),
as translated in Letter from Esteban Miró to José Manuel de Ezpeleta, supra; Benjamin
Franklin, Talk to the Old Chief (June 30, 1787) (available at the Library of Congress), as
translated in Letter from Esteban Miró to José Manuel de Ezpeleta, supra; see also Letter
from Diego de Gardoqui to Esteban Miró (June 22, 1787) (available at the Archivo General
de Indias); Letter from Diego de Gardoqui to Arturo O’Neill (June 22, 1787) (available at the
Archivo General de Indias). Miró states that Chamby and “Payé Mingo” said “the warriors
who had met the Americans had done it of their own accord, and they had not been authorized
by the nation,” that Franchimastabé also upbraided the two, and that they were all willing to
“pledge their allegiance to Spain” but that nevertheless “from my knowledge of the Indians, I
fear they will do as these have done, for there is no obedience or subordination to be had
among them.” Letter from Esteban Miró to José Manuel de Ezpeleta, supra.
251. Letter from William Blount to Richard Caswell, supra note 249 (describing visits).
252. Id.
253. Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1786), in 9 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 49, at 640, 641. Deeply interested in Indian languages,
Hawkins had been able to communicate in the Cherokee and Choctaw languages and he noted
that the Chickasaw language was “radically the same.” Id. at 640. In Philadelphia, he may
have spoken with the visitors. See Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to Thomas Jefferson (June
9, 1787), in 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 49, at 413.
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Once in Philadelphia, Henry Knox, representing Congress as the secretary
at war, met with the Native Nations deputies. The nature and timing of his
meetings are not known. In their wake, however, Knox composed formal
letters to the kings of the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations on Wednesday,
June 27.254 Each letter began acknowledging receipt of the talk sent to
Congress and apologized that the “great Council of the United States” was
not then assembled.255 Knox promised, however, once they did assemble, he
would submit the talks and obtain an answer.256
In his official capacity, Knox pledged the United States to the Treaty
relationships. He formally sent “A Message from the Secretary at War of the
United States . . . in answer to his Message to Congress.”257 And he carefully
constructed the letters to demonstrate the equality between the United States
and the Nations; he repeatedly used the words “brother” and “Nation.”258 To
the Chickasaw Nation, Knox wrote, “Let your Nation keep the Chain of
friendship fast with the right hand.”259 They could “depend” that John White
as superintendent would “hold fast” the other end “on the part of the United
States.”260 Knox promised that White would “take care that all the
Boundaries are preserved agreeably to the Treaties.”261 Indeed, Congress
will “embrace every occasion to convince you how sincerely disposed they
are to preserve all treaties that have or shall be made with you.”262 To the
Choctaw Nation, Knox noted that they could “depend on the friendship of
the United States.”263 The pledges were official commitments.264
Knox promised U.S. medals and gifts as evidence. Medals had become a
visible pledge of allegiance, so much so that the Spanish governor in New
Orleans had threatened to stop trade unless the Native Nations that “wear
British medals” exchanged them for Spanish medals.265 Knox planned to
send “great & small Medals” for their “great Warriors” and “great men of
your Nation” and also “Colour”—flags—for the towns.266 The gifts were
“evidence of the friendship of the United States” and the nation’s “good
disposition.”267
A similar message was conveyed by Benjamin Franklin, the most
important American in Philadelphia other than Washington, when Franklin
254. Letter from Henry Knox to Chamby, supra note 109; Letter from Henry Knox to
Frenchemastubié, supra note 81.
255. See sources cited supra note 254.
256. See sources cited supra note 254.
257. See sources cited supra note 254.
258. See sources cited supra note 254.
259. See sources cited supra note 254.
260. See sources cited supra note 254.
261. See sources cited supra note 254.
262. See sources cited supra note 254.
263. Letter from Henry Knox to Frenchemastubié, supra note 81.
264. Id. Knox wrote to White apparently emphasizing the need to respond to complaints
about trade. See Letter from Henry Knox to James White, supra note 250.
265. Letter from W. Davenport to John Sevier (July 28, 1786) (available at the Hargrett
Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia).
266. See sources cited supra note 254.
267. See sources cited supra note 254.
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met with the deputies. As the Choctaw Nation resided “far asunder,”
Franklin said, he had never had “the Pleasure before to see a Man of your
Nation.”268 Confirming Knox’s message that Congress was not meeting,
Franklin promised that as Tobocah had not been able to do his “Business
there,” Congress in the future would take “your Nation into Consideration”
and give “Satisfaction[,] Brother”269 He gave Tobocah a personal letter with
a pledge of protection because “Mr. Woods and the Indians under his Care”
had come “from far distant and friendly Nations on public Business.”270 And
he ordered gifts from Pennsylvania, including a gorget with the Pennsylvania
arms and calico for the Queen.271 His repetition of “Nations” and “Brother”
underscored Native Nation sovereignty.
With these assurances, Knox and Franklin induced Tobocah and
Muckleshamingo to return home. The pledges of the Treaty relationship
were intended to persuade the deputies to bypass New York. To this end,
Knox agreed to have the United States cover the expenses of the return
journey.272 And Knox attempted to prevent future unexpected visits by
encouraging them to deal with the superintendent, thereby avoiding “the
trouble of sending any of your own people to so great a Distance.”273
Sconetoyah, however, remained unhappy. Franklin sought to reassure him
that justice would be done. As Franklin noted, however, Sconetoyah was
“going back, apparently dissatisfied, that our General Government is not just
now in a Situation to render them Justice.”274 Franklin added that the
discontent would “tend to increase Ill Humor in that Nation.”275 Sconetoyah
also may have met with Knox because Knox requested the purchase of a
horse for “the Cherokee Chief.”276 In addition to or in lieu of such a meeting,
Franklin met Sconetoyah and drafted letters hastening to reassure that
“Justice will be done to your Nation.”277 Franklin grasped that the
fundamental issue was that “the white People encroach on your Lands,
contrary to Treaty.”278 Franklin “assured” Old Tassel that, when Congress
convened in a few months, the Native Nations’ complaints would be
addressed. As a token of his pledge, Franklin sent a silver medal.279
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Franklin, supra note 250.
Id.
Id.
See 15 COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 103, at 229.
See Report of the Board of Treasury (July 18, 1787), reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 353, 353–54.
273. Letter from Henry Knox to Chamby, supra note 109.
274. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to John Sevier (June 30, 1787) (available at the Library
of Congress).
275. Id.
276. See 15 COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 103, at 232. Knox
referenced the 1787 visits in 1789, but he did not do the same for the Cherokee. Letter from
Henry Knox to George Washington (July 7, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON:
PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 162, at 143.
277. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to The Cornstalk, Cherokee Indian Chief (June 30,
1787) (available at the Library of Congress).
278. Id.
279. Id.
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Separately, Franklin wrote to “the Cherokee Indian Queen.” Referring to
Katteuha as “Sister,” he praised her letter to Congress as evidence of her
“Prudence and Wisdom, and your Love of Peace.”280 Franklin promised that
once Congress met, “Justice will be done.”281 Signing himself “Your loving
Brother,” Franklin gave Sconetoyah a medal and sent a picture of himself in
silver for Katteuha.282
Although unauthorized white encroachment threatened an Indian war and
Congress was obliged and committed to uphold the Treaty relationship,
Franklin thought there was a path forward for future white settlement. He
immediately wrote to John Sevier suggesting that he avoid “an Indian War
by preventing encroachments on their Lands.”283 Instead, Franklin
recommended purchasing land as “these People” usually gave “very good
Bargains.”284 A war would result in larger losses than if white settlers were
to fairly buy lands that the Cherokee could “spare.”285 Franklin warned
Sevier: “It may be well however to acquaint those Encroachers that the
Congress will not justifie them in the Breach of a solemn Treaty.”286 Indeed,
the general government would not support the settlers if they brought a war
“upon themselves.”287 Congress would uphold the Treaties.
Reassured by Knox and Franklin that Congress would do justice and would
uphold the Treaty relationship, as well as stop white encroachment, the four
deputies left Philadelphia: Sconetonayah on July 1 or 2 and the others around
July 5.288 The United States covered the cost of transportation to Fort Pitt
for Tobocah, the Queen, and Muckleshamingo.289 From Fort Pitt, possibly
by flatboat, the delegation turned toward home. Sconetoyah returned to
Chota in early September.290 Old Tassel and Hanging Maw received the
medals and silver gorgets; Katteuha, the Beloved Woman, received
Franklin’s picture in silver, a silver hairplate and ear bobs.291 Randolph’s
silver pipe was smoked—and apparently enjoyed most of all.292 The U.S.

280. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Cherokee Indian Queen, supra note 150.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to John Sevier, supra note 274.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See 15 COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 103, at 238 (reporting an
order “drawn in favor of Sidney Paul”).
289. Id. at 277 (listing 114 pounds, seven shillings, and nine pence); Letter from Richard
Butler to Henry Knox (Aug. 26, 1787) (available at the National Archives); Letter from Carlos
de Grand-Pré to Esteban Miró, supra note 102.
290. Letter from Cherokee Indian Women to Benjamin Franklin (Sept. 7, 1787), in 11
PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 181 (Samuel Hazard et al. eds., Phila., Joseph Severns & Co. 1855).
291. Id.
292. Abraham of Chilhawa and Allekieskee, Chief of the Chickamauga, sent talks to
Randolph, noting that they had smoked the pipe. See Letter from Abraham of Chilhawah to
Edmund Randolph (Sept. 15, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note
76, at 342.
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flag now flew in the Cherokee Nation.293 Katteuha sent back to Franklin a
talk and tobacco, hoping that “you & your Beloved men will smoke it in
Friendship.”294 She asked that her talk be placed on the “white stool in
Congress” and that a “beloved woman amongst you . . . will help to put her
Children Right if they do wrong.”295 She hoped that messengers “shall go &
come in safety Between us.”296
IV. THE CHAIN OF FRIENDSHIP
The departure of the deputies created a space in which three striking
developments occurred. First, Congress met and passed the Northwest
Ordinance. Second, Secretary at War Henry Knox prepared a report on the
Native Nations establishing the beginning of the Indian affairs policy that
characterized the Washington administration. Third, the Convention passed
the Supremacy Clause, thereby avoiding a debate over control by a negative
or military force. Only in the final weeks did concerns about possible
linguistic caviling result in the additional inclusion of the so-called Indian
Commerce Clause. I sketch here how each of these developments resulted
from the visits.
A. Congress
Although Knox and Franklin informed the Native Nations deputies that
Congress was not meeting, shortly thereafter, Congress reconvened. Its main
piece of business was the passage of the Northwest Ordinance.297 Was it
coincidence that Congress—hitherto assumed to have adjourned until after
the Convention—hurried back in session? Despite what Knox told the
Native Nations deputies, he was an investor in the Ohio Company and may
have been an instigator of the new quorum. Was the quorum driven by
southern representatives like Blount, who had investment interests in plans
for white settled southern territories? In any event, key Convention delegates
raced to New York. Georgia and North Carolina delegates Blount, William
Few, and William Pierce also traveled back after July 2.298 Hawkins
similarly turned around, abandoning his plans to return to North Carolina.299
And Knox also returned to New York.300 On July 9, Congress achieved a

293. Letter from Alexander Dromgoole to Edmund Randolph (Sept. 15, 1787), in 4
CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 76, at 341.
294. Letter from Cherokee Indian Woman to Benjamin Franklin, supra note 290.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See Staughton Lynd, The Compromise of 1787, 81 POL. SCI. Q. 225, 245–46 (1966)
(arguing for a causal relationship between the three-fifths compromise and the ordinance); see
also VAN CLEVE, supra note 158, at 154–58 (arguing for a causal relationship between the
Spanish treaty negotiations and the ordinance).
298. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 303 (reflecting that
Few and Hawkins arrived and including Pierce’s committee reports); id. at 310 (Congress
assembled); Lynd, supra note 297, at 227, 233, 245.
299. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 303.
300. See Letter from William Knox to Henry Knox, supra note 247.
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quorum when Richard Henry Lee of Virginia presented his credentials after
having spent approximately a week in Philadelphia.301
Reconsidering the Northwest Ordinance’s passage in light of the visit of
the four deputies and the desire of Knox and others to stop them from
reaching Congress, the passage may now be seen in a far more troubling light.
Had the southern Native Nations arrived in New York in early July, the
ordinance would have been entangled in explicit claims of the Treaties’
violations and white encroachment. The idea of creating a blueprint for
temporary government of the western territories would have been in obvious
conflict with the underlying and inevitable expropriation of land. Moreover,
warriors from the Oneida Nation were already in New York; indeed, Knox
had been paying for their lodging and board.302 They complained about the
disorganization of the “indian department” and expressed their disagreement
over personnel.303 The southern deputies would have overlapped with the
Oneida warriors. New York then probably would have become a meeting
place for furthering a Native Nation Confederation, encompassing northern
and southern Nations. For Knox, concerned personally with the Ohio
Company and professionally with avoiding an Indian war, preventing such a
meeting may have seemed of critical importance.
In early July, the proposed western ordinance offered a blueprint for
occupation of territories.304 In it there were two references to Native Nations.
The first explicitly mentioned the extinguishment of Indian title. The
territorial governor was given authority to “make proper division . . . [and]
lay out the parts of the district in which the Indian titles shall have been
extinguished, into counties and townships.”305 The second longer section
embraced the treaty relationship, insisting on good faith and friendship
toward Native Nations.306 It recognized “their lands and property” and
required “their consent” for land and property transfers:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their
lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent;
and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or
disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorised by Congress; but laws
founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and
friendship with them.307

301. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 310.
302. Report of the Secretary at War (July 16, 1787), 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, at 347, 348; see David J. Lehman, The End of the Iroquois Mystique: The Oneida
Land Cession Treaties of the 1780s, 47 WM. & MARY Q. 523, 523 (1990).
303. Report of the Secretary at War, supra note 302, at 348.
304. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of
the River Ohio (July 13, 1787), reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
supra note 42, at 334.
305. Id. at 337.
306. Id. at 340–41.
307. Id.

1744

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

Yet, nowhere in this document was there incorporation of the explicit
boundaries of Native Nations, as agreed to under treaties. That is, the
Indians’ land was something seemingly ephemeral and contingent; indeed,
in place of guaranteeing established boundaries, the ordinance delineated
legal modes of dispossession. Conversely, the ordinance explicitly provided
a path for white settlement. With 5000 “free male inhabitants,” a territory
acquired a legislature.308 Property ownership and a short two-year residency
afforded voting rights.309 The legislature was authorized to send a
“[d]elegate to Congress, who shall have a seat in Congress, with a right of
debating, but not of voting, during this temporary Government.”310 On
reaching 60,000 free inhabitants, the temporary government became a state
admitted on “equal footing with the original States.”311 Significantly, the
ordinance explicitly drew the boundaries of the states—noting that they were
unalterable once Virginia completed its cession of territory.312 Despite
recognizing Indian title and lands, the ordinance predicted the rise of future
states and rendered invisible Native Nations.313
The speed with which the ordinance passed, and the addition of the
antislavery clause, with southerners suddenly “favorably disposed,” has long
intrigued historians.314 On July 9, the report on the ordinance—postponed
since May 10—moved forward.315 A revision limited the application of the
ordinance to the northwest section of the territory above the Ohio River.316
With the change, the ordinance suddenly only addressed the northern section,
divided in the same manner as the recent superintendency of Indian affairs.
The third reading occurred on July 12, and the next day, Congress approved
what became known as the Northwest Ordinance.317 In the final version on
July 13, the ordinance included a new article barring slavery, yet nonetheless
requiring the return of enslaved fugitives.318 New Yorker Abraham Yates
was the sole dissenting vote.319 As prior historians have suggested, Yates

308. Id. at 337.
309. Id. at 337–38.
310. Id. at 339.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 342.
313. Id. at 334–43.
314. Lynd, supra note 297, at 246 n.78 (quoting Letter from Nathan Dane to Rufus King
(July 16, 1787), reprinted in 24 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 249, at 357,
358).
315. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 310 n.3.
316. Id. at 313; see ROBERT ALEXANDER, THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS AND THE THEFT OF NATIVE LAND 88–89 (2017); Staughton Lynd, Foreword to THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE THEFT OF NATIVE LAND, supra,
at 1. See generally Jack N. Rakove, Ambiguous Achievement: The Northwest Ordinance, in THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS, AND LEGACY, supra note 66,
at 1.
317. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 334.
318. Id. at 343 (article 6 of the ordinance).
319. Id. (showing Yates calling for the yeas and nays).
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may have written anonymous articles “opposing the expropriation of Indian
land” and his dissent could have arisen from this concern.320
It was largely white territorial expropriation that motivated the Northwest
Ordinance. That an antislavery provision emerged may have been something
of an ironic fortuity or a silent bargain to temper the concerns of any
antislavery advocates also worried about Native Nation expropriation. For
northerners with investments in the Ohio Company, the Northwest Ordinance
suggested that Congress would not oppose white settlement and would ignore
requests by northern Native Nations to halt surveys. For southerners hoping
to invest in or to occupy the western claims of Virginia, North Carolina, and
Georgia, the Northwest Ordinance seemed to offer a guarantee that, if the
states completed cession of the territories, white settlement could continue.
At the end of the month, Edward Carrington, a Virginia congressional
delegate, linked the new northwestern territorial plan to the apparent growing
Indian Confederacy, as part of a policy of treaties in the face of possible war.
After describing the new scheme for the western territory, Carrington
explained that “Indian affairs wear an hostile aspect” and warned that a
“general confederacy” was being formed.321 As a lot of money would be
required for a war, Carrington argued, it would be “better to spend a little
money in Treating.”322 Turning to hostilities in Kentucky, Carrington again
suggested proceeding by treaty.323 As he noted, “[t]he state of the general
confederacy requires some care in the direction of this business.”324 The rise
of a united Indian Confederacy forced on the United States a choice: treaties
under which white settlement would be based on purchase or an Indian
war.325
B. Secretary at War Report
With the ordinance’s passage achieved, Knox contemplated the
repercussions of the Native Nations visits. The expenses of the visits, and
more broadly the power that the deputies had wielded by appearing in person,
focused his concerns. In addition, Knox worried about the continued effort
by Georgia and North Carolina to claim authority over Native Nations and to
encourage white settlement in lands protected by the Hopewell Treaties.
First Knox sought the departure of the Oneida warriors; as he put it in his
report, “it is the wisest mode to dismiss these people in a civil manner as soon

320. ALEXANDER, supra note 316, at 128, 138–47 (arguing that Yates was Cato, the New
York essayist who, in late 1786, argued that the ordinance was not legal because of Native
Nation possessions).
321. Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (July 25, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 113.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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as possible.”326 Agreeing to send powder, lead, and paper, Knox planned to
“return them immediately to their own country.”327
With respect to the Philadelphia visits, Knox worked quickly to achieve
approval of expenses, operating as if the “Indian chiefs” had reached
Congress.328 Nonetheless, the Board of Treasury warned against future
expenses, as monies from general requisitions “scarcely support the expences
of the Civil Government.”329 The board worried that visits “by Indians of
different Tribes to the Seat of Congress” were accompanied by “very
considerable and unnecessary expense” and might increase.330 The board
and Congress agreed that “all communications to the United States in
Congress” occur “through” the superintendents of Indian affairs.331 And the
resolutions penalized any person serving as a conductor without permission
by making such a person responsible for expenses and permanently forfeiting
his license to trade.332
That same day, July 18, Congress read the secretary at war’s report relating
to the southern Indians.333 As a congressional appointee, Knox treated his
meetings with the Native Nations deputies as if they had met with Congress.
Congress had “received strong complaints from the said Indians” and
“requests for redress.”334 The visits had clarified Knox’s thinking. His report
emphasized the fundamental concerns: first, “certain encroachments on the
lands claimed by said Indians,” and second, the likelihood of war arising
from Georgia’s dispute with the Creek Nation.335 The difficulty for Congress
arose from “state constructions” of the powers “regulating the trade and
managing all affairs” in the Articles.336 The state’s interpretation of the
carveout made any “interference of the United States” difficult.337 For Knox,
the problem arose from Georgia’s interpretation of the Articles’ phrase.
Moreover, Knox foresaw the rise of a general confederacy of Indians to the
south parallel to the general confederacy already existing of “nearly all the
indians” north of the Ohio.338 Knox warned against underestimating Joseph
326. Report of the Secretary at War, supra note 302, at 348.
327. Id.
328. Report of the Board of Treasury, supra note 272, at 353–55; New-York, July 25.,
DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), July 25, 1787.
329. Report of the Board of Treasury, supra note 272, at 354.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 355.
332. See The United-States in Congress Assembled, New-York, July 18, 1787., MD. CHRON.
OR UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, Aug. 15, 1787. In early 1787, a congressional committee,
including Madison and Hawkins, rewrote the instructions for the superintendents but a passage
on visits was deleted. Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs (Feb. 20, 1787), in 32
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 66, 68.
333. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 353; Report of the
Secretary at War, supra note 302, at 365; see also HORSMAN, supra note 25, at 36–39; JONES,
supra note 15, at 157–68.
334. Report of the Secretary at War (July 18, 1787), in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 367.
335. Id. at 365–66.
336. Id. at 366.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 368.
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Brandt, the head of the northern Confederacy, because he was a “man of great
influence and reputed abilities.”339
Ever the pragmatist, Knox saw only one solution to which the southern
states would “be acceded to” regarding territorial disputes between the
independent tribes and the western settlers of North Carolina and Georgia.340
If North Carolina and Georgia ceded the lands involved, the United States
could then “be powerfully enabled to restrain the indians within due
bounds.”341 Although Knox implied acceptance by the general government
of white settlement in the western territory, he explicitly condemned the
North Carolina encroachments. The North Carolina legislature should be
“forcibly” informed that their repeal of the prior 1784 cession “involved the
United States as a Sovereign nation in the deepest disgrace and
humiliation.”342 The Hopewell Treaty had been “flagrantly violated by the
usurpation of the lands assigned by the said treaty as the hunting grounds of
the Cherokees.”343 Likewise, with respect to the Chickasaw and Choctaw
Nations’ concerns, the “treaty and the expectations” of being “supplied with
goods” should be “fully complied with.”344 Finally, to attach the “minds and
affections” of the “Southern and Northern tribes of indians,” Knox
recommended sending medals, gorgets, and wristbands and armbands
engraved with the arms of the United States.345 The plan would subvert
Spanish efforts to exchange British medals for their own and would represent
allegiance to the United States.346
Implicitly addressing the Convention, Knox warned of an inevitable Indian
war unless the United States “in reality possess the power.”347 The power to
which Knox referred was, as he put it, “‘to manage all affairs with the
independent tribes of indians’ to observe and enforce all treaties made by the
authority of the union.”348 The words that Knox placed in quotations
interestingly were not the literal words of the Articles. Knox’s version
acknowledging “independent tribes”—rather than the Articles’ “Indians”—
suggested the modern “Native Nations.” Moreover, Knox’s description of
the power omitted the carveout and substituted instead the relationship
embodied by and through an expansive embrace of treaties: managing affairs
with the independent tribes to observe and enforce all treaties. Knox’s
message to the Convention was clear: reconfirm the general government’s
treaty authority and omit the convoluted carveout; indeed, ensure that the

339. Id.
340. Id. at 367.
341. Id. at 366.
342. Id. at 367.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 368.
345. Id. at 368–69.
346. Id. at 369.
347. Id. at 368.
348. Id. But see ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI (“The united states in
congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating
the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states . . . .”).
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language barring the states was impossible to parse semantically.349 Indeed,
several weeks later at the Philadelphia Convention, James Madison tried to
address Knox’s concern.350
In Congress, Knox’s report was not immediately adopted but pressure on
Congress continued. Indeed, one day later, William Blount wrote to the
North Carolina governor that Congress had received a letter “in the Indian
Language” from Joseph Brandt “informing that all the Nations of Indians”
northwest of the Ohio had “formed a Confederacy offensive &
Defensive.”351 The Confederacy demanded that the United States stop
surveying. Furthermore, reports from Kentucky stated that “the Indians are
hostile on that quarter” and that the Creek would soon start “hostilities” with
“the Citizens of Georgia.”352 On July 21, Yates demanded a voice count of
individual members as Congress continued consideration of Knox’s
report.353 Finally, on July 23, Hawkins secured approval for at least medals
and gorgets.354
Within Congress, some delegates favored Native Nations and promoted
the general government’s exclusive treaty authority. In late July, Georgia’s
congressional delegates were rebuffed in their effort to have Congress aid the
This committee report blamed
state against the Creek Nation.355
encroachment—“[a]n avaricious disposition in some of our people to acquire
large tracts of land and often by unfair means”—as the “principal source of
difficulties with the Indians.”356 The Indians had “just claims to all lands
occupied by and not fairly purchased from them.”357 Rejecting the
“construction” of the carveout, the committee report declared it “by no means
the true one.”358 The general government’s power of “forming treaties or
managing Affairs with the Indians” had long been accepted.359 As the tribes
were “common friends or enemies” of the entire United States, “no particular
state” could have the “exclusive interest” in managing Indian affairs.360
Powers in “managing affairs with them” were “indivisible,” given entirely to
the Union or to the states.361 This dramatic language, however, never made
it beyond the committee. As Gregory Ablavsky points out, Georgia was able
to defeat a supermajority in support of the report.362

349. Id.
350. See infra Part IV.C.
351. Letter from William Blount to Richard Caswell, supra note 249.
352. Id.
353. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 387.
354. Id. at 388.
355. Id. at 407–08; see also Preso, supra note 4, at 451.
356. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 455, 457.
357. Id. at 458.
358. Id. at 457–59.
359. Id. at 458.
360. Id. at 459.
361. Id. at 458; see also Clinton, supra note 4, at 1131.
362. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 463; Ablavsky, The
Savage Constitution, supra note 4, at 1032.
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Later that summer, yet another committee recommended that U.S. policy
regarding Native Nations move toward greater equality and thus aspire to a
general treaty.363 The idea of a general treaty seemed to respond to the earlier
advocacy of the northern Native Nations and also represented an elaboration
of the similarities of the three Hopewell Treaties. In a wide-ranging report,
the committee of Indian affairs declared, “Instead of a language of superiority
and command; may it not be politic and Just to treat with the Indians more
on a footing of equality . . . ?”364 And it favored purchase: “the principle of
fairly purchasing of them and taking the usual deeds.”365 Congress acted on
the report in October.366
The following May 1788, Knox wrote one more report, building on the
principles articulated since the visits of the deputies. Emphasizing the
northern Confederation’s opposition to white settlement, he pointed out that
they “have expressed the highest disgust, at the principle of conquest.”367
Instead of conquest, Knox proclaimed that the United States should adopt the
policy of purchase.368 As Robert Clinton writes, “[t]his recommendation by
Knox later became the cornerstone of federal Indian policy.”369 The visits
had altered U.S. policy at the outset of the government under the new
Constitution.
C. Convention
Even as Knox finished drafting his initial report, the Convention ensured
that the general government’s power regarding Native Nations was exclusive
and, concomitantly, that state power was explicitly prohibited.370 On July
17, the Convention approved broad congressional power and explicitly
declared treaties to be supreme law.371 Notably, Georgia’s delegation
opposed the explicit expansion of power for the “general interests of the
Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent.”372
The delegates then replaced the negative on state law with the Supremacy
Clause. The clause came from the New Jersey Plan, where it had been paired
with U.S. enforcement. The pertinent language was: “[A]ll Treaties . . .
under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the
respective States as far as those . . . Treaties shall relate to the said States, or

363. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 388.
364. Id. at 477, 479.
365. Id. at 480.
366. Id. at 477 n.1, 611–12; see also Horsman, supra note 25, at 41–42.
367. Report of the Secretary at War on Indian Affairs (Oct. 27, 1787), in 34 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 124.
368. Id. at 125.
369. Clinton, supra note 4, at 1135.
370. See PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 68–70.
371. See Convention Journal (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177, at
21, 24 (showing a 6 to 4 vote in favor, with Connecticut, Georgia, South Carolina, and
Virginia voting against).
372. See id. at 21, 24; see also 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 257 (showing the effect of the
amended language).

1750

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

their Citizens and Inhabitants . . . .”373 The benefit of treaty supremacy was
to extend not only to citizens but to a broader category of “Inhabitants.”374
And the wording—explicitly linking treaties to states—prevented possible
caviling about the application of the Hopewell Treaties.
The draft by the Committee of Detail bolstered exclusive general
government treaty power. The legislature was given the power to “call forth
the aid of the militia” to execute laws and “enforce treaties.”375 Immediately
thereafter, the Supremacy Clause appeared as a stand-alone article.376 And
a new article listed prohibitions on the states, including explicitly entering
“into any treaty, alliance, or confederation.”377 This draft adopted the
presumption within both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans that the United
States government had authority with respect to Native Nations. The
contested language from the Articles of Confederation was omitted.378 The
deputies’ presence in Philadelphia underscores that the absence of an
enumerated power was neither inadvertent nor a deliberate omission.379 The
general government had the power to form treaties and manage affairs with
Native Nations.
In Congress, however, Georgia and North Carolina continued to insist on
state power to deal with Native Nations. Over the course of the summer,
Georgia had moved close to war with the Creek Nation. On August 3,
William Few of Georgia and William Blount (both also Convention
delegates) introduced a congressional motion that Georgia and North
Carolina, along with the superintendent of Indian affairs, deal with the Creek
Nation.380 Later that fall, a Georgia legislative committee placed the blame
for the state’s war with the Creek Nation on the “too sudden interferences”
of the United States with state treaties that had suggested to the Indians that
“another disposition” might be made of the territory than becoming part of
the state.381 Georgia went to war against the Creek Nation in the fall.382
At the Convention, as a recent member of the Indian affairs congressional
committee, Madison was familiar with the semantic parsing of the Articles
by the two states and the two states’ recent avowal. On August 18, when the
delegates reviewed the proposed congressional powers, Madison suggested
additional language plausibly designed to bar the two states’ disputed
373. Convention Journal (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177, at 22.
374. Id.
375. 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 264 (showing the August 6 draft of article VII of the
Constitution); cf. id. at 256–60 (July 24 resolutions).
376. Id. at 265 (August 6 draft of article VIII).
377. Id. at 268 (August 6 draft of article XII).
378. See Clinton, supra note 4, at 1152–53.
379. For articles interpreting the Convention as failing to include authority relating to
Native Nations, see Natelson, supra note 15; Prakash, supra note 15; Mark Savage, Native
Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57, 72–
78 (1991); Toler, supra note 172, at 4–5, 34–35 (alleging omission based on a scrivener’s
error).
380. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 454; Clinton, supra
note 4, at 1132–33; Downes, supra note 59, at 164–67.
381. Downes, supra note 59, at 164 (quoting committee language).
382. Id. at 162 (discussing Governor George Matthews’s description of “war” to Pierce).
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claims.383 Read in context, Madison’s proposal focused on the contested
western territories, as of then not yet ceded by the southern states. These
territories were, of course, the lands of Native Nations, most recently
confirmed under the Hopewell Treaties. In proposing new enumerated
powers beyond the implied powers of the general government, Madison’s
first three examples dealt with western areas:
1. to dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U.S. 2. To institute
temporary Governments for new States arising thereon. 3. to regulate
affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits of the U.
States.384

Madison’s proposal seemed driven by the location of Indians—the odd
phrase, “as well within as without the limits” of the United States. What
specifically the phrase referred to is uncertain. Later that week, Madison
expressed concern about possible wording that could be “liable to cavil.”385
He was particularly worried about situations in which a future interpreter
might narrow congressional authority because the draft language did not use
explicit words of inclusion.386 Most delegates did not share Madison’s
anxiety. Nonetheless, Madison’s fretting over a hypothetical situation may
have been the motivation for his idea of an additional enumerated power: it
would cover the lands expected to be ceded—but where cessions remained
incomplete. In short, “without the limits” could include the controversial
territories technically still claimed by the southern states. The continued
congressional effort by Few and Blount may have led Madison to worry that
the draft either needed to bar states explicitly from exercising authority even
over land they claimed or that the United States needed to have its authority
explicitly confirmed. The purpose was to prevent a new semantic argument
launched by Georgia and North Carolina. This suggestion, along with several
others, was referred back to the Committee of Detail.387
When the committee returned a brief report, the report tried a similar but
slightly different approach to address the concern that the two southern states
would continue to insist on their own authority. With the draft already
explicitly prohibiting state treaty power, the committee turned to language
relating to commerce.
They recommended adding to the general
government’s existing power of commerce words that explained that
Congress’s power extended to Indians, including where Native Nation land
lay inside state claims. The proposed language stated, “and with Indians,

383. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 554 (Aug. 18,
1787).
384. Id.; see Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, supra note 4, at 1039–40.
385. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 568 (Aug. 20,
1787); see BILDER, supra note 171, at 135 (stating that Madison similarly worried with respect
to “all laws” not including “offices” and that the treason definition was “too narrow”).
386. BILDER, supra note 171, at 134–35.
387. See Convention Journal (Aug. 18, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177,
at 321.
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within the Limits of any State, not subject to the laws thereof.”388 The
wording again attempted to ensure that Georgia and North Carolina would
be barred explicitly from claiming authority over commerce with the Indian
tribes within either state’s claimed boundaries.389 The phrase resurrected the
long-contested issue of the carveout; as with other controversial matters, it
was referred to the Committee of Postponed Parts.390
In September, perhaps to sidestep the controversy entirely, the committee
crossed out the phrase “Limits of any State”391 and suggested the addition of
the remaining words, “and with the Indian tribes.”392 Congressional power
respecting commerce with the Indian tribes, broadly construed, extended
without regard to geographic or jurisdictional boundaries. The change
clarified that power as to the Indian tribes lay with Congress regardless of
state boundaries and unceded claimed lands.
The final draft was striking in its absolute rejection of the position of
Georgia and North Carolina under the Articles. The treaty power lay in the
general government—states were barred explicitly from making treaties.
The Supremacy Clause applied to all treaties; indeed, the draft made clear
that it applied retroactively to preexisting treaties, thereby encompassing the
Hopewell Treaties.393 The militia could be called out to enforce treaties
within states.394 And Congress had power to manage commerce with the
Indian tribes within a state.
One final, little-noticed change underscored the general government’s
exclusive authority to deal with Native Nations. On Wednesday, September
12, the treaty prohibition lay buried in the list of exclusions in the draft of the
Committee of Style and Arrangement.395 Article 1, section 10 excluded the
states from a list of functions, beginning with coining money and ending with
entering into any treaty or granting titles of nobility.396 On Friday, the
388. Id. at 367 (Aug. 22, 1787) (showing an addition to the end of second clause of the
second section of article VII).
389. Clinton, supra note 4, at 1121.
390. See Convention Journal (Aug. 31, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177,
at 473.
391. Convention Journal (Aug. 22, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177, at
367.
392. Convention Journal (Sept. 4, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177, at 493;
see also Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, supra note 4, at 1041 (offering an alternative
broad interpretation of the shift from “Indian affairs” to “Commerce”).
393. Convention Journal (Aug. 25, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 177, at
409 (showing the August 25 addition of “or which shall be made”); see also 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 619. Madison claimed in the post-1789
section of the notes to have made the motion along with Morris. Id.
394. The discussion on treaties of peace (September 8) later troubled Madison, and that
folio of the notes was replaced. BILDER, supra note 171, at 218–19, 247. The folio includes
one sentence by Hugh Williamson related to the issue of war for the “Western Territory.” 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 704. I am not comfortable
citing it for evidence as to the summer of 1787. But see Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution,
supra note 4, at 1041–42.
395. Report of Committee of Style (Sept. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 177, at 590, 597.
396. Id.
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delegates reordered the section’s arrangement.397 The first words of section
10 became, “No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation.”398 When the Convention adjourned the following Monday,
the instrument appeared to have put an end to claims that the states had
authority over Native Nations. In theory, nothing stood in the way of
Congress honoring the Treaties.
Tobocah had begun his journey to Congress less than a year earlier in the
belief that the Hopewell Treaties confirmed a constitutional relationship
between the Native Nations and the United States. He insisted that the United
States uphold the Treaties and the larger relationship established at
Hopewell. Washington, Franklin, Knox, and others in Philadelphia shook
the deputies’ hands and pledged to uphold the Treaties and to prevent
encroachments. Behind the scenes, some of them also made sure that the
visits did not disrupt white expansion overseen by Congress, which included
an enterprise in which some of them had personal investments. But the visits
influenced the written instrument, securing exclusive U.S. treaty authority
and recognizing the capacity of Native Nations and Congress to honor and
fulfill those treaty relationships—as the Native Nations had insisted.
V. BACK OF THE STATE HOUSE
The influence of the visits lasted long after that summer of 1787. The
Northwest Ordinance opened a vast expanse for white settlement and
furthered the removal of Native Nations. In the southwest, as Knox
predicted, states gradually ceded land to the United States. South Carolina
ceded the strip it claimed in August 1787, North Carolina in 1790, and the
remainder after 1796.399 And long before any territories covered by the
Northwest Ordinance became states, the areas contested in the summer of
1787 did. Kentucky became a state in 1792 and Tennessee in 1796, quickly
followed by Ohio in 1803. To the south, Spanish interest in supporting the
Native Nations east of the Mississippi, which had been waning since 1795,
slowly came to an end.400
Despite the efforts to channel their visits through the superintendents,
Native Nations visitors continued to arrive. They dined with Washington,
smoked the calumet pipe of peace, and offered speeches. In 1789, a
Cherokee agent went to New York.401 In 1792, approximately fifty Iroquois
chiefs and warriors visited the capitol in Philadelphia, including Red Jacket

397. See id. at 610 n.2 (Sept. 14, 1787).
398. Id.
399. PAUL W. GATES, U.S. PUB. LAND L. REV. COMM’N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 57 (1968).
400. See JONES, supra note 15, at 169–70; WEEKS, supra note 57, at 5–8.
401. CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 338; Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate
(Aug. 11, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note
162, at 237.
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and Peter Otsiquette.402 Joseph Brant also visited in 1792.403 In 1793,
Washington, Jefferson, Randolph, and Knox dined with six men and two
women who represented the Kaskaskia, Peoria, Piankashaw, Potawatomi,
and Mascouten Nations.404 A week later, Washington dined with chiefs from
the Six Nations.405 In 1794, Washington met thirteen Cherokee chiefs.406
And a month after that, he met another delegation from the Chickasaw
Nation.407 In 1795, again in July, five Choctaw chiefs and three Chickasaw
chiefs, along with an interpreter, visited Philadelphia.408 As had become
customary, they met with Washington.409
For Henry Knox, the visits still loomed large two years later. In 1789,
Knox recalled the visits in his key advisory memo for Washington.410 In
reporting on the Chickasaw Nation, Knox noted:
In the year 1787 they sent one of the Warriors of their nation to Congress
to represent the distressed situation of the Cherokees, and that unless the
encroachments of the Whites were restrained they should be obliged to join
the Cherokees; and also to enforce the establishment of trade agreeably to
the Treaty.411

He similarly described the Choctaw Nation: “[i]n the year 1787 they sent
Tobocah, one of their great medal Chiefs to Congress, principally in order to
solicit the establishment of trade” because distance had prevented “those
encroachments which have been complained of by the Cherokees.”412 That
memo, built on the foundation of the 1787 reports, went on to establish the
boundaries of the Washington administration’s Indian policy. As federal
Indian law scholars note, the government embraced a “full international selfdetermination model” after 1789.413 Knox explained to Washington that the
“independent nations and tribes ought to be considered as foreign nations,
not a subject of a particular state.”414
402. NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 141–42.
403. Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (June 21, 1792), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 162, at 489.
404. See CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 414–15.
405. Colin G. Calloway, George Washington Lived in an Indian World, but His
Biographies Have Erased Native People, LONGREADS, https://longreads.com/2018/11/07
/george-washington-lived-in-an-indian-world-but-his-biographies-have-erased-native-people
[https://perma.cc/EJW9-C2UY] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Letter from Timothy Pickering to George Washington (July 7, 1795), in 18 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 162, at 295; see also
Calloway, supra note 405. See generally COLIN CALLOWAY, THE CHIEFS NOW IN THIS CITY:
INDIANS AND THE URBAN FRONTIER IN EARLY AMERICA (forthcoming May 2021).
410. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 276; see also Letter from
Henry Knox to George Washington (June 15, 1789), in 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 162, at 488 (including enclosures).
411. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 276, at 144.
412. Id. at 145.
413. AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 17 (Carole E.
Goldberg et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015); see Horsman, supra note 17, at 40–41.
414. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 410.
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In the immediate aftermath, the two men who had served as conductors for
the Native Nations deputies struggled financially. After the visits, John
Woods continued efforts to recover his expenses. In December 1787,
Congress paid “for his services and expences attending sundry Chiefs of the
Choctaw Nation on a visit to Congress.”415 After further disputes with the
Board of Treasury, Knox intervened in June 1788 and Congress authorized
sufficient funds for Woods to “Journey homewards.”416 Alexander
Dromgoole, the Cherokee Nation, and Sevier recommended him for the
position of superintendent of Indian affairs, but Martin was appointed
instead.417 In 1789, Dromgoole continued to carry talks between state
officials and the Cherokee Nation, as well as the Creek and Chickamauga
Nations.418 Thirty years later, Dromgoole curiously petitioned Congress in
1823 for compensation related to “services rendered in the intercourse
between the United States and the Cherokee Indians, in 1787.”419 What led
to this belated effort is not apparent.
In west Yazoo, Tobocah kept the gifts—the armbands, gorgets, sword,
sash and, apparently, even spectacles—as evidence of his connections.420
When Spanish official Stephen Minor visited in 1792, Tobocah showed him
a small box containing portraits of George Washington and others.421 And
he told the Natchez governor, Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, that General
Washington “treated him with great intimacy, having his house open at any
hour and even recommending to him that he should frequent it often” in New

415. Joseph Nourse, Enclosure: Statements of September 24, 1789 No. II: Indian Affairs,
in 5 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 400, 405 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 2011) (reporting
a payment made to John Woods on December 31, 1787).
416. Report of Committee on Memorial of J. Woods (June 19, 1788), in 34 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 240; Report of Board of Treasury on Memorial
of J. Woods (Feb. 28, 1788), in 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42,
at 74 (showing a treasury report reflecting that money paid was full compensation); Report of
Secretary of Congress on Sundry Memorials and Letters (May 14, 1788), in 34 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 152, 153–54 (referring to a memorial of and
payment for John Woods); 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at
192 (June 2, 1788) (reporting transmission of a petition for pecuniary assistance of May 30,
1788); Report of Board of Treasury on Memorial of J. Woods (June 4, 1788), in 34 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 200 (describing his “pertinacious
adherence, in prosecuting unwarrantable and extravagant Claims”); Report of Board of
Treasury on Memorial of J. Woods (June 12, 1788), in 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 230.
417. Talk of Headmen & Warriors of the Cherokee Nation Indians to President of Congress
(Sept. 8, 1787) (available at the National Archives); Letter from Bennet Ballew to George
Washington (Aug. 22, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL
SERIES, supra note 162, at 516.
418. Letter from Alexander Dromgoole to Samuel Johnston (Feb. 20, 1789), in 21 THE
STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 62, at 529.
419. H.R. JOURNAL, 18th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1823).
420. See Letter from Alexander Fraser to Esteban Miró (Apr. 15, 1788), translated in
Papers from the Spanish Archives Relating to Tennessee, 14 E. TENN. HIST. SOC’Y PUBL’NS,
86, 99–100 (D. C. Corbitt & Roberta Corbitt ed. & trans. 1942).
421. WEEKS, supra note 57, at 74.
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York.422 Tobocah may have even been among a group of Choctaw chiefs
who visited Philadelphia in 1795.423
As for Sconetoyah, I have found little. Perhaps he led a long life, but he
may have been murdered by a white militia member in 1788. The claimed
justification for the murder was retaliation for the murder of members of the
Kirk family by Slim John, a Cherokee.424 The surviving member of the Kirk
family, John Kirk, set off to retaliate, along with John Sevier and 150
Franklin militia members.425 Despite a lack of evidence of more extensive
Cherokee involvement, Sevier and his militia burned Cherokee towns and
murdered inhabitants.426
Reaching the Cherokee town of Chilhowee, Sevier’s forces surrounded the
town where Old Tassel and Old Abraham were meeting in council.427 They
were allegedly flying a flag—a U.S. flag given to them at Hopewell.428 The
chiefs were told Sevier was on his way to meet with them and that the
Franklin militia carried a white flag of truce.429 But it was all a lie. With the
chiefs inside the cabin, Kirk was permitted to enter and by tomahawk kill
each man.430 In addition to the three chiefs—Old Tassel, Fool Warrior, and
Old Abraham—Kirk murdered several other male relatives of the chiefs.
One included a man sometimes described as Old Tassel’s son.431 That man
might have been Sconetoyah. In the aftermath, Sevier claimed to be a quarter
mile away during the massacre.432 He then refused to prosecute Kirk.
Congress offered resolutions condemning the act.433 Sevier was eventually
prosecuted but found not guilty.434 War broke out and Martin ended up
leading the forces against some of the Cherokee.435
In the summer of 1794, Muckleshamingo returned to Philadelphia along
with Piomingo to meet George Washington and Henry Knox. Washington
told them to “consider yourselves at home and take comfort accordingly,”
and he promised that if they wanted to “go further and see the City of New
York,” the secretary at war would make arrangements.436 In addition,
422. Id. at 75 (quoting Letter from Manuel Gayoso de Lemos to Baron de Carondelet (Apr.
14, 1792)).
423. O’BRIEN, supra note 3, at 64–66; WEEKS, supra note 57, at 75–76; Letter from
Timothy Pickering to George Washington, supra note 409, at 295.
424. BARKSDALE, supra note 121, at 114.
425. Id.
426. Id. 114–15.
427. Id. at 115.
428. WILLIAM R. REYNOLDS JR., THE CHEROKEE STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN IDENTITY IN THE
17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES 258 (2015).
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. (including “Tassel’s son”). But see BARKSDALE, supra note 121, at 115.
(suggesting Old Abraham’s son and Old Tassel’s brother).
432. REYNOLDS, supra note 428, at 258.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. See BARKSDALE, supra note 121, at 116–17; REYNOLDS, supra note 428, at 264–66.
436. Enclosure: To the Chiefs & Warriors of the Chickasaw Nation (July 11, 1794), in 16
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 162, at 332; see
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Washington was authorized to “employ such a number of Indians” to serve
“against the hostile tribes northwest of the Ohio.”437 Washington appointed
Muckleshamingo to the rank and pay of “Captain of the Militia.”438 The
signed commission noted “having full confidence in the well tried friendship
of Muckleshamingo a chief of the Chickasaw Nation.”439 Future president
John Quincy Adams attended the reception.440
Shortly thereafter, in 1800, William Birch published an engraving entitled,
Back of the State House. In the print, a group of men—members of Native
Nations—walk across Independence Square in Philadelphia. Talking in an
animated fashion, they attract little attention from the white Philadelphia
inhabitants strolling the grounds. The perspective is from the front of
Congress Hall—and the group seemingly is headed in that direction. The
print seemed to commemorate the long history of such visits. Did the title
Back of the State House suggest that Native Nations had been removed from
the regular channels of governmental power or did it demonstrate the
ubiquitous presence of Native Nations in U.S. governance? Either way, the
deputation occupied the center.

Letter from Pitchlynn to Delavillebeuvre (July 16, 1794), in PROBLEMS OF FRONTIER DEFENSE,
1792–1794, pt. 3, at 319, 319 (Lawrence Kinnard ed., 1946).
437. HORATIO BARDWELL CUSHMAN, HISTORY OF THE CHOCTAW, CHICKASAW AND
NATCHEZ INDIANS 483 (Greenville, Headlight Printing House 1899).
438. Commission to Muckleshamingo, a Chief of the Choctaw Nation (July 20, 1794)
(available at the Oklahoma Historical Society). For background information on the
commission, see R. S. COTTERILL, SOUTHERN INDIANS: THE STORY OF THE CIVILIZED TRIBES
BEFORE REMOVAL 111 n.31 (1954).
439. Commission to Muckleshamingo, supra note 438.
440. 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795
TO 1848, at 34 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Phila. J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1874).
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Figure 3. Back of the State House (close up)441

CONCLUSION
Congress’s relationship with Native Nations is older than the Constitution
of 1787. The Constitution further pledged to uphold that relationship.
Restoring the deputies to Philadelphia makes it clear that their visits proved
to be a catalyst that influenced the Convention and the general government.
The visits by the deputies of the Native Nations highlight understandings
between Congress and Native Nations that centered on treaties absorbed into,
confirmed, and clarified by the written Constitution. In 1787, the United
States promised the deputies that it would uphold treaties, ensure justice, and
preserve peace and friendship. These 1787 visits marked the beginning of
the Washington administration’s policy that presumed Native Nation
sovereignty, pledged protection against white encroachment, and sought
expansion through purchase as opposed to claimed conquest. Yet the same
visits also threatened to destabilize Congress’s effort to seize control of white
encroachment and to convert it into a federally controlled process of
establishing white inhabited states. The visits thus also marked the beginning
of efforts to discourage Native Nations from sending deputies to Congress.
Although Native Nation leaders continued to appear to press claims, the
failure to remember the 1787 visits created a space for Justice William
Johnson’s effort in 1831 to deny that the Hopewell Treaties contained a right
441. Russell Birch, supra note 2.
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to a deputy in Congress. Recovering the visits of the deputies to Philadelphia
in 1787 and the promises they received, including Washington’s handshake,
suggests that the United States today should reaffirm the right and the
importance of Native Nations sending deputies to Congress.

